Interview with Dmitry Pozhidaev | No “color revolution” in Serbia

After the victory of the “Student List” in the elections in Serbia. Photo: AFP/OLIVER BUNIC After the fall of President Vučić, there is great euphoria in Serbia. However, it is completely unclear how much will really change as a result of the change in government. How drastic do you think what happened was?

Im klassisch marxistischen Verständnis bedeutet »Revolution« die Veränderung der Klassen- und Eigentumsverhältnisse. Dies ist in Serbien offensichtlich nicht der Fall. Seit November 2024 gab es überwiegend friedliche Proteste: Demonstrationszüge, studentische Blockaden, Gedenkveranstaltungen, die Selbstorganisierung in Vollversammlungen. Und jetzt hat die »Studentenliste« tatsächlich die Wahlen gewonnen – unter Bedingungen, die ich als »kompetitiven Autoritarismus« bezeichnen würde. Vučić's ruling party has systematically distorted the rules of the game in its favor. But pressure from the street translated mass mobilization into a parliamentary majority. If the old government's grip on the state could be broken now, it would have enormous consequences. Then one could certainly speak of a “political revolution”.

Dmitry Pozhidaev is a Russian-Serbian economist and teaches at the University of Belgrade. He writes regularly for the English-language online magazine LINKS: International Journal of Socialist Renewal, the Serbian platform Peščanik and the independent left-wing media project Rabkor in Russia.

President Vučić has repeatedly portrayed the protests against him as a “color revolution” staged by foreign forces. He even wanted to write a book called “How I Defeated the Color Revolution in Serbia.” International ist die Suche nach ausländischen Drahtziehern zu einem beliebten Mittel geworden, um unwillkommene politische Entwicklungen zu diffamieren. The Russian authorities describe any form of dissent as “foreign interference.” The British government, conversely, blames Russia for the Brexit referendum. The Serbian movement, however, emerged within the country itself.

What was characteristic of Vučić was that he relied on very different actors. He cooperated with the EU, the USA, Russia and China. European support for the students has not harmed this collaboration. What is interesting is that the foreign policy program of the “Student List” suggests continuity. It calls for maintaining the partnership with Russia, coordinating positions on Kosovo in the UN Security Council and rejecting sanctions against Russia. These commitments go hand in hand with support for Ukraine's territorial integrity, cooperation with the EU and the US, and a strategic partnership with China. While “After Tito – Tito” was a popular slogan in Yugoslavia, the formula proposed here is “After Vučić – Vučić”. So you really can't claim that the movement was an instrument for a geopolitical realignment.

The student list has avoided a clear positioning on many topics in order to reach as many people as possible. Can you still classify them politically?

Yes, the student list was rather vague on sensitive issues that divide Serbian society. However, a few days before the election she published a detailed program. When it comes to socio-economic issues, a lot of things sound social democratic: the program proposes free school books, affordable housing, uniform drug prices and the restoration of medical care in rural areas. In addition, the duration of fixed-term employment contracts should be limited to one year, maternity leave should be extended and the right to strike in solidarity should be guaranteed. The limitations of this program are obvious: it does not aim to socialize the economy by giving workers and society effective power over production, investment and wealth distribution.

It was also criticized that the movement presented itself as quite nationalistic.

I would say their symbolism highlighted domestic grievances: blood-red handprints, Serbian flags, university coats of arms, commemorative banners. Furthermore, by excluding symbols from foreign organizations – the EU, NATO and Russia – the movement has shown its independence from competing geopolitical camps.

How do you explain the collapse of the Vučić regime?

The protests against authoritarianism, political violence and environmental destruction have unfolded in three major waves since 2017. The collapse of the Novi Sad train station roof and the deaths of 16 people were the immediate trigger for the movement. For a large part of society, the tragedy became evidence that the government was endangering people's lives. In this context, it is important that the protests were not accompanied by an economic crisis. On the contrary: During the election campaign, the government referred to growth, rising wages and pensions. Despite ongoing social problems, the International Monetary Fund forecast growth of four percent for 2027.

A central slogan of the movement, similar to Ukraine in 2014, was the fight against corruption. From a left-wing perspective, one could argue that this is an idealistic demand. Corruption has less to do with the failure of the state than with a country's position in the global economy. It arises where accumulation in the productive sector is hardly possible.

I would say that corruption is a failure of the state. Bourgeois democracy, imperfect as it may be, grants working people a measure of control over the state. Corruption undermines this achievement. And in dependent countries like Serbia, corruption serves political capitalists far better than democracy. Behind the demand to punish those responsible for corruption lies the question of who the state should serve. Embezzled funds mean underfunded hospitals and schools. The allocation of jobs by state officials makes people dependent on those in power. In this sense, the fight against corruption is an expression of a comprehensive demand for justice.

However, it is true that the post-Soviet experience shows the limits of this agenda. The Ukrainian Marxist Volodymyr Ishchenko, who is extremely critical of the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, attributes the return of "Maidan revolutions" to the failure to resolve the crisis: the leaders change, but the social concerns of the majority remain unfulfilled. Serbia has already gone through a similar cycle. The Serbian Progressive Party under Vučić came to power in 2012 with an anti-corruption program. The arrest of oligarch Miroslav Mišković became a symbol of the new government's determination. Now, however, corruption has become one of the main reasons for Vučić's downfall. We will see if society can now hold those in power to account and enforce material improvements.

You also look at the situation in Serbia from a Russian perspective. What can Russian opposition groups learn from the events?

The students' victory should neither be overestimated nor underestimated. The removal of the old circle of power does not in itself create a democratic order. Declining participation and deepening differences could pave the way for a Bonapartist solution: the rise of a leader who promises to reconcile divergent interests. In addition, the new government will encounter resistance from the old power networks, budgetary constraints and pressure from outside. Serbia's peripheral position in the global economy limits its scope for action.

At the same time, what has been achieved is remarkable. A mass movement defeated a government that had far greater resources and dominated the media. The path that led to this is also remarkable: Serbia's limited democratic freedoms offered opportunities for organization, mobilization and participation in elections. In states with even more authoritarian structures such as Russia, these options are largely closed.

So the fight for democratization is central to the Russian left?

The left definitely has a direct interest in defending and expanding democracy under capitalist conditions. This does not mean giving up an independent socialist program. I would say that democratic rights are achievements of the struggles of working people and their allies. Their defense preserves the conditions in which these battles can continue to develop. In Serbia, the question now is how the opening will be used: whether participation will be extended to the workplace, whether workers will gain influence over investments and distribution, and whether demands for accountability will also reach economic power.

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