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The year 1956 and socialism | A break in epochs without a success story

The dramatic year 1956: Khrushchev's "secret speech", the bloody autumn in Hungary and the Suez crisis.

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Is this what the “other” socialism looks like? A brief rebellion in Hungary was soon followed by tanks. Photo: dpa It was a year of hope and disappointment: 1956. It started promisingly with a “secret speech” at the XX. Congress of the CPSU, held by its First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev. It did not remain secret for long and aroused high expectations, but ended bloodily in the suppression of the uprising in Hungary and a new world constellation for the countries of the Global South.

The half-hearted de-Stalinization, which only focused on the personality cult around Stalin and the worst excesses of repression under his rule in the Soviet Union and was also caught in the corset of the system debate, soon led almost back to the old routine and was intended to stifle discussions in the socialist camp about reforms and alternatives to the previous model of socialism.

Khrushchev and his confidants naturally suspected what they had initiated and what serious problems could arise for them. But they relied on the tolerance of the Soviet people and the millions of members of the CPSU, as well as on the mostly unquestioned loyalty of the "brother parties" and "brother peoples" in Eastern Europe - and then they were surprised, like party leader Walter Ulbricht in the GDR in 1953. The trauma of the workers' uprising on June 17 made them prick up their ears. They wanted to control discussions and prevent serious opposition to reforms.

Ulbricht first ended the intellectual uprising surrounding the philosopher Wolfgang Harich and the chief editor of the Aufbau publishing house Walter Janka, both of whom were sentenced to long prison sentences in a show trial in the spring of 1957, and then eliminated the inner-party faction around Politburo member Karl Schirdewan and MfS boss Ernst Wollweber that was acting to overthrow him. However, some branded reform ideas were later reflected in the New Economic System (NÖS) in the mid-1960s.

While things remained relatively calm in Czechoslovakia, there were dramatic clashes in Poland and Hungary, the people were by no means as obedient as they had hoped in Moscow after the highly official criticism of Stalinism. In June 1956, a hundred thousand workers protested in Poznań, and intellectuals everywhere in Poland argued about better socialism and “free” alternatives. On June 28, the Polish military intervened.

The suppression of the locomotive workers' strike in Poznań, which was primarily about better living conditions and the abolition of rigid working standards, cost more than 70 people their lives. In September, trials were opened against leading "insurgents", which Władysław Gomułka, who returned to the head of the party and government the following month, had stopped in order to pacify the situation in Poland, which was escalating again.

Gomułka was expelled from the party in 1948 because of alleged right-wing nationalist deviations from the leadership circle around Bolesław Bierut. A show trial had already been prepared against him, similar to the one in Czechoslovakia against Rudolf Slánský and comrades, which ended with death sentences. But now in October 1956 Gomułka was celebrated as a national hero during his re-inauguration speech in front of the Palace of Culture in Warsaw, incidentally a former "gift" from Stalin to the Polish people, while things were already heating up in Hungary.

He wanted Moscow to ensure that “every country enjoys full independence and self-reliance,” and “the right of every nation to sovereign rule in an independent state should be fully and mutually respected.” However, this remained a fallacy - until 1989. It should also be mentioned here that Stalin supporter Bierut suffered a fatal heart attack shortly after reading Khrushchev's "Secret Speech" in March 1956.

Khrushchev's comment on the different reactions that his criticism of Stalin triggered in Eastern Europe is interesting: "It is no coincidence that the unrest took place in Hungary and Poland and not in Czechoslovakia. Because the standard of living in Czechoslovakia is incomparably higher." He also tried to explain the "peace" in the multi-ethnic state of the Soviet Union in this way: "In the USSR, over 10,000 members of the CPSU were rehabilitated and over a million were released from prison. These people are not angry with us because they see that we have done a lot to raise the standard of living in our country. In our country they also listen to BBC and Radio Free Europe. But hearing isn’t so bad on a full stomach.”

Course corrections, reforms and revolutions do not always achieve what they are intended to achieve. By October 1956 at the latest, Khrushchev's team must have understood this. While in Poland, thanks to Gomułka's negotiating skills, she did not send her military against demonstrators but withdrew, in Hungary she opted for a violent solution.  

The uprising in Hungary began on October 23, 1956 with peaceful protests by students in Budapest demanding democratic changes. Across Hungary, academics and workers in Petőfi clubs have been discussing necessary changes for months. On October 6, 1956, with great public sympathy, the honorable burial of László Rajk, who was executed in 1949 after a show trial and was rehabilitated after Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech, took place.

»In our country, too, they listen to the BBC and Radio Free Europe. But hearing isn’t so bad on a full stomach.”

Over 200,000 capital city residents joined the student protest in Budapest. They marched to parliament and the broadcasting building, demanding freedom of the press and freedom of expression, more independence from Moscow and the appointment of the reform-minded Imre Nagy as prime minister, which surprisingly happened that same night. However, this did not succeed in stabilizing the situation in the country. Violent clashes broke out, demonstrators were shot and images of lynched members of the security forces and communists went around the world. Soviet troops advanced. After a short time, however, an agreement seemed to have been reached and the Soviet troops initially withdrew.

Nagy stuck to his plan to undertake reforms. At the same time, he tried to achieve special status for his country and neutrality for Hungary in negotiations with the Kremlin. That went too far for Moscow. Especially since an international conflict had broken out in the Middle East with the Suez crisis. On November 4, 1956, Soviet tanks rolled into Budapest. The fighting, which lasted until November 23, cost over 3,000 lives on both sides. As a result, Hungary experienced a sensitive exodus of its citizens, including many creative minds, to the West.

Moscow elevated the old communist and former Stalin victim János Kádár to power in Hungary. Using the slogan “Whoever is not against us is for us,” he understood how, within the scope of his ability, to provide the Hungarians with a more attractive socialism over the next few decades, which was derided as “goulash communism.” Nagy, on the other hand, was kidnapped by the KGB under false promises and sentenced to death in a secret trial for "treason."

Khrushchev's hope for a policy of peaceful coexistence with the class enemy and a new role for the so-called Third World seemed to collapse in the shadow of Hungary's Hungarian tragedy. The crisis of the Soviet bloc encouraged neo-colonial powers to use force to secure zones of influence that were breaking away from them: In July 1956, Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced the nationalization of the British-French dominated Suez Canal Company, which not only challenged two Western European major and former colonial powers, but also Israel. The invasion, launched from Tel Aviv on October 29, 1956 and supported by British and French troops from November 5, was met with international outrage.

What was crucial, however, was Moscow's massive threat against the interveners, which found support from US President Dwight D. Eisenhower. In 1956, Washington did not want to see the Yalta world order dissolved in either Hungary or the Suez Canal. The conflict was resolved in March 1957. The overthrow of Nasser, who propagated pan-Arabism and tried to practice Arab socialism, planned by two Western European democracies, had failed. A victory for Khrushchev.

1956 represents a break in the era, which, however, did not result in a success story. Khrushchev's speech, delivered on the night of February 25, 1956, was primarily intended to be a liberation for the CPSU, which was struggling to renew itself after Stalin's death in 1953, but at the same time it was much more than that. In retrospect, however, Khrushchev himself was probably not only disappointed that his “secret speech,” which he deliberately sent abroad, was only “sold for very little money” and was therefore “not viewed as particularly valuable,” but also that it almost brought about an end to state-established socialism in Eastern Europe.

Nevertheless, the year 1956 opened previously closed doors: ruthless repression should be a thing of the past, peaceful paths to socialism should become possible and an opportunity should open up to enter into peaceful system competition with the capitalist West.

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