US foreign policy after the midterms: “Trump wants to produce results for the history books”

taz: Ms. Major, after the Democrats' victory in the midterm elections, US President Trump is very weak. Can the world breathe a sigh of relief?

Claudia Major: There was a lot of enthusiasm in Europe. Understandably. But in foreign and security policy, the results could mean more chaos.

Major: There is less congressional oversight in foreign policy and trade. That's why we can expect to have another round of arguments. So more institutional confrontation, but no change of course in US foreign policy.

taz: So you think that Trump will now use the foreign policy stage even more?

is a political scientist and expert on security policy. Since March 2025, she has been Senior Vice President for Transatlantic Security Initiatives at the German Marshall Fund.

Major: Yes, I assume so, because the US executive is less controlled by Congress. And he will be tempted to do “legacy shopping”, i.e. produce results for the history books. This in turn increases the risk of new conflicts and tougher demands on Europe. And: It's not January yet. Only then will the new Congress begin its work. That leaves Trump and his Republican allies a period of time in which they can still act with fewer congressional restrictions. Now Trump still has all the power with regard to Russia, Ukraine, and Iran to make decisions that will no longer be so easy to reverse when the Democrats are back.

taz: What does that mean specifically for Ukraine?

Major: I don't have a crystal ball. But here's an example: Congress has control over appropriations, and this is an opportunity for Democrats to expand support for Ukraine. You can also initiate one of the many investigations into whether the funds allocated have been used correctly and whether the government has implemented all of its obligations. But the problem is, even if Congress says this is what we want, that doesn't mean that the weapons will actually be delivered or that certain security arrangements will actually be implemented, because so much power lies with the executive branch. The same applies to Europe's defense and NATO, for example the stationing or withdrawal of troops. Even when Congress tries to stabilize transatlantic relations, as it did last year with the National Defense Authorization Act, which sets guidelines for the Pentagon, the president can rhetorically and politically question everything again. This also weakens the message of deterrence. It's not just about capabilities, i.e. soldiers, drones, tanks, but also about whether people believe the US stands by its European allies, and the president has repeatedly questioned that politically.

taz: So there is no reason to be happy at all?

Major: In Europe there was an instinctive joy. Of course! Democratic change works! But Trump even ignored his own Republican majority when it came to Ukraine. Why should he now allow himself to be restricted in any way by the democratic party, i.e. from his point of view, the opponent?

taz: How should the Europeans react now?

Major: Definitely don't sit back. The Europeans need to work much more closely with Congress, but at the same time maintain contact with the administration. You have to build and maintain networks and a relationship of trust with both parties and the different currents within them. The Democratic Party is still deeply divided and it is not clear how it will position itself.

taz: No hope for transatlantic relations?

Major: So the approach: “The populist has been voted out and it will be fine again” – unfortunately that is not the case. What decided the election? The high cost of living, the war in Iran and the poor performance of this government. Europe's foreign policy, apart from Iran, has hardly played a role. If post-Trump is called Rubio or if post-Trump is called Vance, then we can't lie down in a hammock. Even the Democrats have made it clear in recent years that the US's strategic priorities are no longer in Europe. What Europeans want is predictability and reliability. That would be progress.

Major: The same thing that should have been true for the Europeans for a year and a half. Don't look at America and jump over every stick that Trump throws at us, but think about it: What do we want? How do we get there? So act and don't react. We are still making ourselves far too dependent on Washington. To put it bluntly, this means: If everything goes well again in Washington, won't we invest more in defense? That can't be the answer.

taz: Trump likes to see himself as a bringer of peace and would like to go down in the history books. Could this spirit lead to a possible ceasefire in Ukraine?

Major: I would be happy if that were the case. But he has been trying to do this for a year and a half and so far it has failed due to Russia's lack of interest and the USA's unwillingness to put massive pressure on Russia. A war usually ends either when someone wins, when there is outside intervention, or when there is a stalemate and quitting is more attractive to both sides than continuing. From Russia's perspective, Trump did not implement what Moscow had hoped for, i.e. an end to the war on Russian terms. But from the Russian perspective, it is still more attractive to continue fighting than to stop and seriously negotiate. Things are going well for Ukraine on the front, but the situation in the hinterland is catastrophic because of the lack of anti-aircraft and missile defense. Russia is pursuing its depopulation strategy even more comprehensively than in recent years because it has more and new systems and uses air warfare to destroy what it cannot conquer militarily: the basis of life, from the rail network to supermarkets, electricity and data centers. With the aim of wearing down Ukraine before the winter really starts. Why should Russia compromise now?

taz: After all, the First Lady, Melania Trump, has brought about a temporary humanitarian ceasefire in Oleschky. Isn't that a sign?

Major: The fact that the humanitarian catastrophe in Oleshky was solved in such a way that Russia got involved in it for the first time is wonderful news. It would be excellent if the next step came now and a sectoral ceasefire followed, for example for grain deliveries across the Black Sea. But that requires willingness. Trump has consistently put pressure on whoever he can put pressure on. This is Ukraine. And with Russia he was less willing to put so much pressure on it that the Russian calculation would have changed. It seems more likely to me that we will return to the tactical negotiation cycles that we have seen in recent years, like in Istanbul. Then there are several negotiation sessions again and then it stops again. Until the calculations of those involved change.

taz: You mean the next round of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine next week in Abu Dhabi?

Major: A sectoral ceasefire would be a nice start. If we move from a sectoral to a comprehensive ceasefire and then to negotiations – that would be excellent. But unfortunately I don't see any signs at the moment that Russia has changed its position.