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Russian attack on the Baltics: “NATO is not prepared for a drone war”

Deutsch (original) · Auto-translated to English

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Istories opens a window to Russia with the following article. You can read the entire text here in Russian.

Vladimir Putin could begin invading the Baltic states, says Robert Browdi, commander of Ukraine's drone force. According to him, Putin could rely primarily on his army's drone superiority in an attack on the Baltics. The NATO states are not prepared for a drone war.

There are also fears in the West of a Russian attack on the Baltic states. According to Wall Street Journal sources, CIA Director John Ratcliffe visited Putin at the end of August to warn him against an invasion of NATO territory. In the USA, the Baltic states are considered a possible location for such an operation.

According to military experts, as long as the war in Ukraine continues, the Russian army will probably not have enough forces for a large-scale invasion. However, Putin could try to occupy at least a small border area with a few thousand soldiers.

If Russia decides to launch a ground invasion of one of the Baltic states, the scale of the operation would depend on the objective. According to experts, Russia's main goal would not be to occupy larger territories, but to split NATO. The calculation is that given the threat of a large-scale war with Russia, some members of the alliance may not be willing to enter into armed conflict over small areas of territory.

In addition, Vladimir Putin may see an attack on one of the Baltic states as an opportunity to change the course of the war against Ukraine. According to the Atlantic Council think tank, the situation on the front there has reached a dead end.

“Europe's logic today is that the ongoing war in Ukraine delays the timing of a possible Russian attack,” said analysts at the independent online media and analysis project Re:Russia.

According to analysts, this delay is one of the most important pragmatic arguments for providing Ukraine with comprehensive financial and military support. “However, the Kremlin could try to reverse this logic and make the threat of a large-scale military conflict in Europe part of the Ukraine negotiations.”

“An escalation of the conflict is exactly what many in the world and in Europe will try to avoid - and that is undoubtedly what Russia is counting on,” agrees the founder of the Ukrainian OSINT project Frontelligence Insights.

To achieve such a goal, Russia could attempt to occupy a small border area or city with limited forces. According to Frontelligence Insight, a regiment of up to 2,500 soldiers could be sufficient, supported by the elite drone unit “Rubikon”. However, a subsequent conflict with NATO would require significantly larger military forces, says US military analyst Michael Kofman.

Experts from the pan-European think tank ECFR also believe that a larger scenario is conceivable for Estonia: the capture of Narva with a subsequent advance towards the Estonian capital Tallinn. This could be accompanied by an attack from the Pskov region of Russia towards Tartu.

Another possible target is the Suwałki Corridor, which stretches between the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus along the Polish-Lithuanian border. At its narrowest point it is only around 65 kilometers wide. If Russia were to take control of this area, the Baltic states would be cut off from land routes for NATO reinforcements. Troops and equipment could then only be moved by sea.

In June 2026, investigative journalists found that Russia was building military bases on its borders with NATO countries - including the Baltic countries - where up to 115,000 soldiers could be stationed.

Since the accession of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, NATO has been developing defense plans for the Baltics. A concept adopted in 2020 envisaged a temporary Russian occupation of parts of the Baltic states and Poland: the armed forces there were to intercept the first attack until NATO reinforcements arrived and the lost areas were recaptured.

According to the then Estonian Prime Minister Kaja Kallas, up to 180 days were planned for this. After Russia's war crimes in Ukraine, she warned that such an occupation would mean "wiping off the map" for the Baltic states.

NATO has never officially confirmed that it would accept a temporary occupation of its own territories. At the summit in Vilnius in 2023, the alliance decided on a new strategy: occupation should be prevented from the start of an attack. At the same time, the NATO presence in the Baltic states is expected to grow from around 1,000 to 3,000 to 5,000 soldiers per country.

In the event of a Russian attack, the Allied Reaction Force, NATO's rapid reaction force, is likely to be deployed. Their strength is expected to increase from 40,000 to 300,000 soldiers. The force is not permanently stationed in the Baltics, but should be ready for action within a few days in an emergency.

NATO sees the accession of Finland and Sweden as an important factor for the defense of the Baltic states. This has improved the ability to supply troops in Lithuania, Latvia and especially Estonia across the Baltic Sea. A NATO combat group with battalion strength, i.e. with 300 to 1,000 soldiers, has already been set up in Finland.

NATO also promises to protect the Baltic states from missile and air attacks as well as attacks from sea and cyberspace. The “Eastern Sentry” mission is particularly highlighted. After Russian drones and aircraft repeatedly violated NATO airspace on a large scale in 2025, the alliance committed to deploying additional air defense systems, aircraft, helicopters and frigates to the eastern flank.

According to estimates by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Latvia and Estonia each have around 8,000 active soldiers, while Lithuania has around 17,000, including conscripts. With the involvement of the respective territorial defense forces, this number could be increased many times over within a short period of time.

The crucial question is whether the NATO allies would be prepared to enter into a war with Russia if small Baltic border areas were occupied. Although Article 5 obliges the NATO states to support each other, it does not automatically oblige them to enter war. Each member decides for themselves what help they think is necessary.

How the allies would react to a Russian attack therefore remains open. The Institut Montaigne believes both a united intervention by NATO as well as limited support from the USA or even a waiver of help by individual alliance states are possible.

The position of the USA as the most powerful NATO member could be decisive. Donald Trump has repeatedly criticized the allies and even threatened to leave the alliance. The Baltic states are therefore trying to secure at least a small US troop presence on their territory.

Sergei Potapkin from the Latvian Institute for International Relations writes that any Russian attack would also endanger US soldiers from the start. That would significantly increase the price of escalation for the Kremlin and turn a “European issue” into a direct challenge to the United States.

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Source: taz