Comoros and Seychelles: Towards a Nuclear-Free Indian Ocean

By: Mohamed Soulaimana Azhar*

Nuclear disarmament issues are often seen as far removed from the realities of Africa. Yet East Africa and the Indian Ocean constitute a major geostrategic region at the crossroads of international shipping routes, energy resources, the military interests of major powers and new geopolitical rivalries¹. The Mozambique Channel, the eastern coast of Africa, the Horn of Africa and the western Indian Ocean are key areas for global trade, energy security and military projection.

In this context, the accession of the Comoros and the Seychelles to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is far more than merely symbolic. Following a campaign by the SALAM NGO², a partner of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), the Comoros ratified the TPNW on 19 February 2021, and the treaty entered into force for the country on 20 May 2021. The Seychelles³ ratified it on 9 July 2021, with it coming into force on 7 October 2021, following advocacy by the Seychelles First Movement, also a partner of ICAN.

These two island states have chosen to base their security policy on prevention, disarmament and the rejection of nuclear weapons. Their approach offers a model for other countries in East Africa and the Indian Ocean, particularly those facing external military powers, strategic installations and growing geopolitical rivalries.

As at 16 July 2026, the TPNW had 75 States Parties and 95 signatories. In particular, it prohibits the development, testing, production, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, as well as their stationing on the territory of a State Party.

The key question is therefore this: what lessons can other states in East Africa and the Indian Ocean learn from the experiences of the Comoros and the Seychelles?

The hypothesis put forward in this article is that regional accession to the TPNW could help to build a new security environment based on four complementary dimensions: (1) strategic, (2) political, (3) security and (4) economic.

The TPNW and the NPT: two complementary instruments serving the same objective

To understand the significance of the accessions of the Comoros and the Seychelles to the TPNW, we must first place this move within the context of the international regime for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which was opened for signature in 1968 and entered into force in 1970, remains the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime. It has 191 States Parties, including the five States officially recognized as nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty. The NPT has three fundamental objectives: to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to promote the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and to pursue nuclear disarmament.

The NPT is, however, based on a specific historical framework. It distinguishes between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, whilst Article VI commits the parties to pursuing negotiations in good faith with a view to nuclear disarmament.

Against this backdrop, the TPNW emerged as a response aimed at addressing what its proponents regarded as a shortcoming of the existing regime: the absence of a universal and categorical ban on nuclear weapons comparable to that which exists for other categories of weapons of mass destruction.

The TPNW does not, therefore, replace the NPT. The two instruments can be regarded as complementary: the NPT seeks to prevent proliferation, regulate peaceful uses and pursue disarmament, while the TPNW establishes a legally binding prohibition for its States Parties. This complementarity has also been examined in a working paper submitted as part of the NPT review process.

For East Africa and the Indian Ocean, accession to the TPNW therefore does not mean abandoning the NPT. States can use the NPT to consolidate non-proliferation and international safeguards, and the TPNW to reinforce the objective of prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons.

The current momentum surrounding the NPT further underscores the importance of this complementarity. The 2026 NPT Review Conference concluded without a consensus⁴ amongst the 191 States Parties, against a backdrop of significant international tensions.

For African states, this situation strengthens the case for regional and complementary disarmament instruments.

Lesson One: A strategic dimension for East Africa and the Indian Ocean

East Africa and the Indian Ocean are not peripheral regions in international relations. The Mozambique Channel, the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa and the shipping lanes of the western Indian Ocean lie at the heart of the major political challenges of today’s world, characterized by competition between major powers.

The presence of significant energy resources, notably Mozambique’s hydrocarbons, as well as the region’s proximity to major international trade routes, gives it considerable geopolitical importance.

The Mozambique Channel must therefore be regarded as a strategic area of global energy security. The expansion of energy investment, offshore hydrocarbon development, ports and maritime infrastructure is increasing the region’s strategic relevance and attracting greater competition over resources, routes, infrastructure and influence.

This evolving environment makes it important to prevent economic and geo-economic competition from developing into broader military and nuclear rivalry. The concentration of critical energy assets and strategic maritime infrastructure in the Mozambique Channel strengthens the case for regional mechanisms based on prevention, transparency, confidence-building and arms control.

The establishment and consolidation of a regional nuclear-weapon-free framework would constitute an important instrument in this regard. Africa already possesses a strong legal and institutional foundation through the Treaty of Pelindaba, which establishes the African continent as a nuclear-weapon-free zone⁵. The Treaty prohibits the research, development, manufacture, acquisition, possession, stockpiling, testing, and stationing of nuclear weapons on the continent. It further requires States Parties to place their peaceful nuclear activities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

The Pelindaba framework therefore provides an established continental basis for preventing the introduction or development of nuclear weapons in strategically sensitive areas such as the Mozambique Channel. Combined with stronger regional cooperation, maritime confidence-building and diplomatic engagement, it can help keep the Channel anchored in peaceful development and collective security rather than escalating military competition.

The Comoros and the Seychelles are already parties to the Pelindaba Treaty. The treaty currently has 43 African States Parties. Accession to the TPNW would therefore provide an additional layer of legal and political protection.

It would thus be possible to gradually develop a regional zone linking the African nuclear-weapon-free zone established by the Pelindaba Treaty, the states of the Horn of Africa, the Mozambique Channel, the island states of the western Indian Ocean and, in the long term, cooperation with the territories and external powers concerned with the region’s security ⁶.

The aim would not be to turn the Indian Ocean into a demilitarized zone. Rather, a distinction should be maintained between conventional military presence and the presence or deployment of nuclear weapons, in order to prevent strategic territories in the region from becoming part of a wider nuclear architecture.

This distinction is fundamental for small states. Membership of the TPNW ⁷ enables them to turn their geographical vulnerability into a diplomatic tool: rather than being at the mercy of competition between the major powers, they can help to set regional standards.

Lesson Two: A political and diplomatic dimension

The second lesson concerns the ability of small states to influence international norms. The Comoros and the Seychelles demonstrate that a small state can take an initiative whose scope far exceeds its military or economic clout.

Accession to the TPNW is therefore an act of foreign policy. It enables a state to adopt a clear position on nuclear weapons without seeking to enter into a military competition with the nuclear powers.

In particular, the states in the region could develop a common position within the African Union towards the Division for Disarmament, Counter-Terrorism and Non-Proliferation, which forms part of the Department of Political Affairs, Peace and Security (PAPS) of the AU Commission, the United Nations, regional security mechanisms, NPT review conferences, and meetings of the States Parties to the NPT, and the mechanisms of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone.

Such a coalition would enable the states of East Africa and the Indian Ocean to speak with one voice on the nuclear issue. This would be particularly important for those states that maintain close relations with major military powers. Their accession to the TPNW could be presented not as a policy directed against any particular state, but as a regional policy aimed at risk prevention.

This distinction is crucial. The aim should not be to automatically accuse foreign military bases in the region of harboring nuclear weapons. The publicly available information does not support such a claim for each of these facilities. However, their strategic importance warrants a regional discussion on the risks associated with power projection, the potential stationing of strategic capabilities, and the use of territories in the region within global military architectures.

Three areas deserve particular attention in this regard: Diego Garcia, Djibouti and the French territories in the Indian Ocean, notably the island of Réunion (France) and the Comorian island of Mayotte.

These areas play different military and strategic roles. Their presence nevertheless serves as a reminder that East Africa and the Indian Ocean are directly linked to the defense structures of the major powers.

The issue of the status of French territories is particularly complex and must be handled with care. Protocol III of the Pelindaba Treaty specifically sets out obligations concerning territories situated within the African nuclear-weapon-free zone for which an external power bears international responsibility.

Thus, the challenge for African states is not merely to accede to the TPNW themselves. It also involves promoting regional coherence, particularly with regard to the commitments of external powers and territories situated within the African geographical area.

Lesson Three: The security dimension

The third lesson is probably the most important: nuclear disarmament can be viewed as a regional security policy. East Africa’s security is currently facing numerous risks: terrorism, piracy, armed conflicts, illicit trafficking, irregular migration, transnational crime, political tensions, maritime insecurity and competition for natural resources.

In such an environment, the presence of nuclear weapons or the possibility of their deployment does not constitute an appropriate response to the daily threats faced by populations. On the contrary, a race to build up strategic capabilities could divert resources needed to combat conventional and non-conventional threats.

Membership of the TPNW would make it possible to rethink regional security on a basis that prioritizes risk prevention rather than nuclear deterrence. Such an approach would offer states in the region the opportunity to gradually develop a common security doctrine, based on non-proliferation, the prevention of nuclear risks, regional cooperation and the strengthening of confidence-building measures. This doctrine could be based on several fundamental principles:

1. Non-acquisition and non-development of nuclear weapons;
2. The prohibition on the stationing of nuclear weapons;

1. Maintaining the peaceful nature of nuclear activities;
2. Strengthening regional security cooperation;
3. The establishment of a regional dialogue on strategic risks;
4. Promoting compliance with regional standards by external powers.

Conceived in this way, accession to the TPNW would be more than a legal commitment to prohibit nuclear weapons. It could help catalyse a regional security approach based on prevention, cooperation, transparency and risk reduction rather than nuclear deterrence.

The issue of military bases remains relevant, but military presence should not be confused with nuclear presence. As noted above, Djibouti, Diego Garcia and Réunion play different strategic roles; the regional challenge is to secure greater transparency, dialogue and assurances regarding military activities that could affect the security of coastal states.

From this perspective, collective accession to the TPNW could become a means of building trust. It could also strengthen cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), the specialized body responsible, in particular, for implementing the Treaty on the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Pelindaba Treaty).

Lesson Four: The economic dimension of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation

The nuclear issue is often viewed primarily from a military and strategic perspective. However, nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation also have an important economic dimension. For East African and Indian Ocean states, this matters particularly in a context of scarce public resources and multiple development priorities.

The states in the region face considerable needs in health, education, infrastructure, maritime security, climate adaptation, energy transition and economic diversification. Against this backdrop, strategic military competition, particularly in the nuclear field, could place a disproportionate burden on national development priorities. TPNW membership can therefore be seen not only as a choice about international security, but also as a form of economic security, helping states preserve resources for human development and national resilience.

By making a legal commitment not to develop, acquire, possess or transfer nuclear weapons, states can reduce incentives to devote financial, scientific and institutional resources to military nuclear capabilities. This can help prioritize investment in infrastructure, food security, social services, technological innovation and the capacity to build resilience to new threats.

This issue is of particular importance in the context of the Mozambique Channel, which is at once a strategic area, a major shipping route and a region characterized by the presence of significant natural resources. Hydrocarbons, in particular, represent a significant economic opportunity for several states in the region. However, their exploitation can also give rise to geopolitical rivalries, attract external military interests and contribute to the gradual militarization of the maritime domain.

From this perspective, the TPNW can help promote an alternative model of regional security: one in which strategic resources are regarded primarily as instruments of economic development and cooperation rather than as factors fuelling military rivalry. Disarmament should therefore be seen not only as reducing military capabilities, but also as helping create conditions for a more peaceful and productive use of available resources.

Finally, a fundamental distinction must be drawn between nuclear weapons and the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. A commitment to non-proliferation and disarmament does not imply rejecting nuclear science or technology for civilian purposes. The NPT recognizes the right of States to peaceful uses of nuclear energy, while the Pelindaba Treaty also safeguards African States’ right to develop peaceful applications of nuclear science and technology.

TPNW accession therefore does not constitute a rejection of scientific innovation or technological progress. Rather, it draws a normative distinction between peaceful nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. For East Africa and the Indian Ocean, this makes it possible to combine economic development, regional cooperation and peaceful technology with stronger commitments to conflict prevention and reduced nuclear risk.

Towards a regional drive to join the TPNW

The experience of the Comoros and the Seychelles points to a second stage in consolidating the regional nuclear disarmament regime: moving from national accessions to a concerted regional approach. This is particularly relevant because several states in East Africa and the Indian Ocean already have diplomatic traditions favourable to disarmament and nuclear-weapon-free zones. The Pelindaba Treaty provides an existing legal and political foundation on which wider TPNW accession could be built.

Such a process could follow four complementary stages. First, awareness could be raised nationally by engaging governments, parliaments, academic institutions, the armed forces, civil society and the media. The Comorian campaign by the SALAM NGO shows how parliamentary and civil-society involvement can help create a political environment conducive to accession.

The second stage would involve a national strategic assessment. Each State should assess the implications of its potential accession to the TPNW in the light of its foreign policy, its defense priorities, its relations with nuclear powers and its existing international commitments. Such an assessment would enable the issue of disarmament to be placed within the context of a comprehensive approach to national and regional security.

The third stage should place civil society at the centre of regional coordination efforts aimed at advancing TPNW universalization. Civil society organizations, research institutes, academic institutions, youth networks and disarmament advocates can bridge governments, regional organizations and local communities. Their role should extend beyond advocacy to policy research, awareness-raising, technical support and the facilitation of dialogue among states.

In this context, civil society organizations could develop a regional roadmap for TPNW universalization with interested governments, the African Union and other relevant regional organizations. Such a roadmap could identify priority countries, document national experiences, develop policy and legal resources, organize regional consultations and provide technical assistance to governments considering signature or ratification. It could also create platforms through which the Comoros and the Seychelles share their experiences with other African and Indian Ocean states, demonstrating that accession is compatible with national security, regional stability and existing non-proliferation commitments.

This regional coordination could transform individual national initiatives into a collective movement for nuclear disarmament. Regional networks of parliamentarians, diplomats, academics, young leaders and community organizations could sustain momentum through research, public diplomacy, parliamentary engagement and strategic communication, helping governments translate commitments into concrete accession processes.

The fourth stage should focus on building a regional diplomatic coalition supported by civil society. Civil society organizations could provide governments with evidence-based research, legal analysis, policy briefs and coordinated advocacy positions for the NPT review process, TPNW meetings and other relevant multilateral disarmament forums. They could also facilitate dialogue between states and help ensure that regional priorities are reflected in international debates.

Such a coalition would give African and Indian Ocean states greater collective diplomatic visibility, while civil society maintained public engagement, monitored governmental commitments, supported parliamentary diplomacy and connected regional initiatives with international disarmament networks.

TPNW universalization should therefore be understood not simply as encouraging additional states to join the Treaty, but as building a sustained regional political and societal movement for nuclear disarmament. By connecting national advocacy, regional coordination and international diplomacy, civil society can help move the TPNW towards a genuinely universal instrument of international security.

Conclusion

The experience of the Comoros and the Seychelles shows that small states can play an active role in shaping international security standards through international law, multilateral diplomacy and regional mechanisms. Their accession to the TPNW, alongside participation in the NPT and the Pelindaba Treaty, illustrates the complementarity between non-proliferation, disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons.

This approach could be extended across East Africa and the Indian Ocean through institutions including the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), East African Community (EAC), Southern African Development Community (SADC) and Eastern Africa Standby Force (EASF). These frameworks provide spaces for dialogue, trust, security cooperation and the promotion of disarmament.

The challenge is to move beyond national commitments towards a regional approach based on three principles: preventing nuclearization, strengthening coherence between the NPT, Pelindaba Treaty and TPNW, and promoting regional cooperation based on transparency, prevention and collective security.

The Mozambique Channel, Horn of Africa and Indian Ocean deserve particular attention because of their geostrategic, maritime and energy significance. Foreign military installations should not be equated with nuclear deployments, but their strategic importance justifies regional dialogue on proliferation risks and maintaining a nuclear-weapon-free regional environment.

The experience of the Comoros and the Seychelles could therefore become a starting point for a regional nuclear security community. Gradual TPNW accession by other states could be understood not only as a disarmament measure, but also as an instrument of sovereignty, preventive diplomacy, regional stability and sustainable development.

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* Executive Director of the SALAM NGO, Moroni, Comoros, PhD student in International Relations and Diplomacy, Center for Diplomatic & Strategic Studies (CEDS), Paris

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Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Prof. Lucy W. Moina (PhD), Dr. Michel Rosalie, Dr. Leonardo Bandarra, Tony Robinson, and Mr. Ahmed Hassani Ali for their valuable proofreading, comments, and suggestions on this article.

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