Russia | Boris Kagarlitzki: The parasitic groups themselves are the power

Russian sociologist Boris Kagarlitsky was placed on the terrorist list and spoke at a military court hearing in late 2023. Photo: Imago/ITAR-TASS Mr. Kagarlitzki, you have been in a penal colony since 2023. The Russian justice system convicted you because of your critical stance on the war in Ukraine. Maybe you could start by telling us what your prison conditions are like.

I didn't come to the penal colony until May 2024. Before that, I was imprisoned in various prisons: Syktyvkar, Moscow, Tver and Rzhev. In December 2023 I was even released for a short time - the authorities probably hoped that I would leave the country. But I was determined to stay and was imprisoned again. As for prison conditions, they vary greatly from one prison to the next. But the IK-4 penal colony in Torzhok has comparatively mild prison conditions. I know about the situation of many other political prisoners, and our circumstances are much better.

Boris Kagarlitzki, born in Moscow in 1958, is a sociologist. During his studies he dealt with “critical Marxism” – which was banned in the Soviet Union – and was therefore expelled from the university in 1980. A little later he was sentenced to prison for contributing to a left-wing magazine. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kagarlitzki remained loyal to a Marxist perspective, unlike many other Eastern European intellectuals. He founded the “Institute for Globalization Studies and Social Movements”, worked in numerous international networks and was most recently involved in the creation of the left-wing Russian YouTube channel Rabkor. Because he condemned the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Kagarlitzki was indicted, arrested and sentenced to five years in prison in 2024. He is currently in Penal Colony 4, about 250 kilometers north of Moscow. This interview was conducted by letter and under conditions of censorship. Although it was preceded by an exchange of content, it was not possible for "nd" to respond to Kagarlitzki's statements with counter questions. As a result, individual statements remain somewhat abrupt. The conversation was mediated and facilitated by Dmitrij Poschidaev. The development economist has repeatedly initiated and published joint research and debate contributions with the political prisoner, especially since Kagarlitzki's imprisonment. “nd” thanks Poschidaev for this tireless solidarity work.

In your case, communication with the outside world is not prevented and you have recently even published articles. Is the prison administration not interested in political views if certain limits of criticism are not exceeded?

Formally, the censorship is moderate and clearly defined: You are not allowed to discuss escape plans, pass on personal information about prison staff or send threatening letters to people who are free. Of course, censors in different places interpret their duties differently. I've heard that in other prisons even completely harmless things were blacked out in letters. But that doesn't happen here. And in Zelenograd the censor was an educated woman who occasionally came by to discuss with me the philosophical and historical questions raised in my correspondence.

In an audio interview you conducted with the Russian media channel Rabkor last year, you reported that prisoners are often offered a reprieve from prison if they decide to take part in the "special operation" in Ukraine. Have Russia's prisons emptied in recent years?

Every month the penal colony's statistics are published for everyone to see. As a sociologist, I find this extremely interesting. When I arrived here in May 2024, 35 to 40 inmates were leaving the colony every month to join "military special operations," as it is officially called. By 2023 there will be 200. Last year the number had already fallen to eight to twelve people per month. This year there were never more than four. Usually there are one or two, but there are months when no one responds.

"The wars reflected the systemic contradictions of global capitalism."

In recent years there have been two readings of the situation in Russia on the international left. Some considered the country to be the "greatest authoritarian threat of the moment" and even believed the liberal narrative that Putin was behind Donald Trump. In the Global South, however, the prevailing assessment is that Russia is a victim of NATO and that the conflict in Ukraine was provoked by the West. You don't share both analyses. Can you outline your interpretation for us?

The debate over the character of war largely reflects the arguments exchanged during the First World War, 1914 to 1918. As is well known, part of the left back then supported its own imperialism. We remember well the role that German social democracy played back then. The Russian social democrat Georgi Plekhanov, on the other hand, supported tsarism. Still others, such as Russian Menshevik leader Julius Martov, argued that both sides should "get the plague."

Lenin asked the question fundamentally differently. For him, the crucial point was not which imperialism bore greater responsibility for the outbreak of war, but rather how the situation could be used in favor of the revolution. Obviously, the defeat of tsarism opened the possibility for revolutionary change in Russia. For this reason Lenin was called a “defeatist.” But he never supported the German Empire, even if his opponents slanderously accused him of doing so. Lenin's position seems to me very relevant today.

In your book “Empire of the Periphery,” published in 2007, you write that Russia has repeatedly pursued imperialist policies throughout its history, but that this expansion was ultimately driven by economic weakness. Russia was penetrated imperialistically by Western Europe, but it also pursued colonial policy in Asia. Can you summarize it like that?

Yes, that's exactly how I would describe it. It is important to note that Russia always experienced a period of socio-political transformation after the defeats in the Crimean War of the 19th century, the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and finally the First World War. It is equally important to understand that these wars were by no means the result of bad intentions of individual rulers. Rather, they reflected the systemic contradictions of global capitalism and the internal, also systemic crises of the regime ruling in Russia. And that is exactly what is extremely important if we want to understand the conflict of the present. The same script is played out again and again, even if our times of course have their own peculiarities.

What should an analysis of imperialism look like today? If I understand you correctly, it is crucial not to simply criticize the actions of Putin or Trump, but to adhere to a materialist concept of imperialism. What would that mean for contemporary Russia?

In my book "From Empires to Imperialism" I tried to explain the differences between these phenomena and concepts. Imperialism presupposes a particular capital structure and an associated accumulation regime in which the state is closely linked to the leading monopolistic corporations. This in turn shapes the understanding that the dominant groups have of the national interest. But expansion, conquest and domination are by no means always used as tools to accumulate capital or secure markets for companies. Politics is also determined by what we can call the tendential interests of the dominant groups. In this respect, Russia is a very interesting case. Its raw materials companies are extremely wealthy but structurally, technologically and organizationally weak. The state tries to behave like a normal imperialist power - although more like one of the 19th century than the 20th - occupying territories and defending spheres of influence. At the same time, the country lacks the resources for this. One could describe this situation as “failed imperialism”.

"Russia's vulnerability is not political, but economic."

How do Russia's armed conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine actually relate to the country's economic crises? You have already indicated that nothing has changed in Russia's dependent development, especially its dependence on raw material exports, despite increased nationalism. To what extent is Russian geopolitics related to economic weakness?

Yes, Russia's vulnerability is not political, but economic. The ruling circles parasitically consume the resources inherited from the Soviet Union. By the way, the same can be said about Ukraine. After the start of the war in 2022, there were some attempts at modernization and re-industrialization in Russia, especially in the armaments sector, but not only there. However, these efforts have stalled not primarily because of the technological backwardness that is so often talked about, but because of the structural interests of the ruling elite. It is impossible to modernize the country without removing these parasitic groups from power. The problem, however, is that you are the power.

For a long time, “imperialism” was understood as what socialists described at the beginning of the 20th century something like this: capital is concentrated into monopolies through competition, with industrial and financial capital merging. Because the domestic markets are becoming too small, monopoly capital expands outwards with state support and in doing so comes into conflict with other nation-state organized monopoly capitals. Capitalism today shows important differences: production networks and financial capital are much more transnationally organized than around 1900.

Transnational connections certainly existed before the First World War, but not to the same extent as they do now, that's true. The world systems theorist Immanuel Wallerstein has convincingly explained how capitalism initially emerges as a world economy and how national capitalisms only emerged on this basis. In a sense, the war in Ukraine demonstrates both the inevitability of conflict and the extent of interdependence. The question now is: why is it taking so long? At the beginning of the war, Russian state ideologists liked to talk about the weakness of the West. This situation has now changed and Western Europe no longer appears weak - at least from the Russian perspective. On the other hand, the West does not appear united either.

Staging Russian imperialism: Putin (back, center) chairs a meeting of the Council for Strategic Development and National Projects. Photo: AFP/Gavriil Ggrigorov In my view, Western elites saw no need to fight their Russian neighbors in 2022-2024. Despite all the rhetoric about Putin's regime, they got along quite well with that regime. They pursued a policy that was intended to bring Russia to its senses. According to the motto: “You made a mistake when you attacked Ukraine. We won't punish you severely for this, but we need to put a little pressure on you so that you realize the absurdity of the situation." In Russia, however, this was interpreted as weakness.

At the end of 2025, the European Union and Great Britain took a tougher approach, although they were aware that a possible regime change in Russia could have socio-economic consequences that would be absolutely unpleasant for those in power in Europe. The Trump administration, on the other hand, continues to use persuasion - partly because it believes Europe and China are the real problems and that Russia could potentially use Russia against both. But that won't work.

"Without the state there can be no stable markets."

But why are national conflicts becoming so intensified? Marxist authors such as Costas Lapavitsas and William I. Robinson have emphasized that the transnationalization of capital continues despite the conflicts. In this sense, US-based funds manage Russian, Arab and even Chinese capital. Why then are conflicts between these states still deepening?

William Robinson and I have discussed this question a lot. Of course, a lot has changed with regard to transnational capital. But transnational corporations lack the institutions that would allow them to control territories and populations. They have no armies, police forces or courts; they do not control the development of basic research, without which technological developments and so-called "innovations" would be impossible.

Libertarians like to criticize leftists for using iPhones. They forget that it is estimated that at least a third of the technology used in the iPhone comes from publicly funded research. Without the state there can be no stable markets and therefore no capitalism. The slogan of “the powerlessness of the state,” so popular in the 1990s and 2000s, served primarily to obscure state policies that were intended to unwind the social gains of working people. In his book "Technofeudalism," Yanis Varoufakis describes the rise of corporate groups that are tied to specific states and regions: the USA, China and Western Europe, which he considers to be significantly weaker. I don't like the title of the book though. This has nothing to do with “feudalism”. It would be more appropriate to speak of techno-imperialism. But there is also a social dimension to the problem. Contrary to what many expected, no transnational bourgeoisie has emerged. At the same time, the national institutions of the bourgeoisie have become weaker, their networks less dense and the interests of the ruling classes at the national level less consolidated. I would say that we have been seeing a kind of declassification of the bourgeoisie since the 1990s and perhaps a little earlier. In the 1960s, the economist André Gunder Frank used the term “lumpenbourgeoisie” for Latin America. This phenomenon has become widespread. And Russia is an extreme case.The entire ruling class here has undergone “lumpenization.”

In Germany you no longer notice much of the mood in Russia. How does the Russian population view the West? Do people believe the government rhetoric that the West wants to invade Russia?

Russian society is heterogeneous, like any other. There is a wide spectrum of beliefs - from the idealization of the West to its demonization. But I have yet to meet anyone who would consider the West an imminent threat. Nationalists tend to view the West as a bearer of unacceptable values ​​and therefore something that should ideally be destroyed. Or at least to which you should inflict as much damage as possible. On the left, however, there is a rational analysis of imperialism. And the intellectual influence of the left has, of course, noticeably increased.

And what does Russian society think of China? Abroad there is often talk of a Chinese-Russian alliance, but China is probably just as distant to many Russians as it is to the population in Germany.

Fear of Chinese expansion is quite widespread in Russian society. Sometimes it is rational: China buys resources at ridiculous prices, Chinese companies promote the reckless destruction of forests, and so on. But sometimes the fear is also irrational. When I worked in Irkutsk, I found that there were many people there who believed that the Chinese were planning to drain and drink all the water from Lake Baikal.

In addition to the willingness to go to war, the influence of authoritarian movements is also growing all over the world. How do you explain that?

The neoliberal model of capitalism has exhausted itself. This was already evident during the Great Recession from 2008 to 2010. But those in power refused to modify their course or even fundamentally change it. As a result, the liberal center collapsed and with it the “moderate” social democracy. However, the problem is not based on this, but rather in the weakness of a left-wing alternative that the same liberals and right-wing social democrats politically marginalized at the beginning of the 21st century. The resulting ideological and political vacuum was filled by right-wing populism. In the absence of real, substantive alternatives, the institutions of parliamentary democracy have become useless in the context of the crisis. With this in mind, it is easy to understand why ordinary people are disillusioned with democracy. Paradoxically, the situation in Russia is better. Ordinary Russians are disillusioned with authoritarianism.

"I think the comparison with 1914 is very justified."

How do you actually experience the confrontation between people from Ukraine and Russia? Do you see it as a repeat of the tragedy of 1914, when the working class allowed itself to be swept away by the nationalist frenzy of those in power, or are comparisons of this kind unhelpful?

I think the comparison with 1914 is very justified. However, there was no enthusiasm for war in Russia in 2022 to 2023, as was observed in Germany, France or the Russian Empire after the outbreak of the First World War. Instead, what was observed was confusion and a kind of fatalistic submission to the state: "We were told we have to fight, so we fight." It didn't go beyond that. A third of the population was against the war from the start, which explains the large number of political prisoners without any connection to opposition parties and organizations.

In Ukraine the situation is somewhat different. Again, it may be helpful to remember the First World War. When German troops were 70 kilometers from Paris, it was quite difficult to carry out anti-war agitation. The imperialist character of the war only became clear in France afterwards. My impression is that something similar is happening in Ukrainian society today.

In the USA, socialist positions are suddenly becoming publicly visible again. In Europe, the regime of the neoliberal center is crumbling. What is the situation in Russia: do you have hope for change?

I watch the successes of the American left with admiration. Although the Democratic Socialists of America (DSA) was long a marginal organization, with left-wing intellectuals in New York or Berkeley complaining that society didn't understand them, the DSA is now winning primaries and has managed to win New York mayoral elections. I don't know how Mamdani's career will develop in the future, but right now he is just great.

Compared to this, the European left presents a much less encouraging picture. Nevertheless, a victory for the extreme right is by no means inevitable. The main fight is still ahead of us. And indeed, the left is becoming the main force in the defense of democracy. But it needs much more serious and radical socio-economic programs. The left has lost sight of the issue of public ownership and replaced the fight for structural reforms with the defense of minority rights. Unfortunately, this policy ultimately does little good even for minorities and migrants, most of whom not only suffer from discrimination but also from the economic crisis.

What are the prospects for the left in Russia?

We will see this soon when the failure of current policies leads to an open crisis. I can't say we were prepared for this. It is not possible to truly prepare for such events. And yet we are better prepared than any other political movement in Russia.

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