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Russian Shadow Fleet | Bundestag decides on sensitive new Irini mandate

The Bundeswehr should be allowed to control Russian ships in the Mediterranean. Sea rescue explicitly does not remain a task of the renewed EU operation.

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Relatives of the crew members of a naval ship that was deployed in Irini in 2023 say goodbye in Wilhelmshaven. Photo: dpa/Hauke-Christian Dittrich On Wednesday evening, the Bundestag will discuss in the first reading the federal government's proposal to continue German participation in the EU military naval operation Irini for one year. It is planned that up to 300 soldiers will participate. The “operation-related additional expenses” are said to amount to around 16.6 million euros. The second reading of the motion and thus the vote on the mandate in the plenary session is announced for next week.

The current Irini mandate expires on November 30, 2026. However, the extension also brings with it a change in tasks. After the expiry of a corresponding resolution by the United Nations (UN) Security Council, the enforcement of the arms embargo against Libya through the inspection of ships will no longer be necessary. However, monitoring and reporting possible embargo violations should remain.

Also on Wednesday evening, the Bundestag will debate the extension of the mandate for the NATO operation Sea Guardian in the Mediterranean. It officially serves to secure the “southern flank” and combat terrorism and arms smuggling and “complements” Irini. German participation in Sea Guardian consists mainly of naval units that are already in the area. Following the debate, this motion will be referred to the committees for further discussion; there is no date for the second reading yet.

The background to the Irini mandate change is a readjustment of the EU's military policy towards Russia. But there were also complaints about one-sided controls to the detriment of the internationally recognized government in western Libya: the ships suspected by Irini often came from Turkey and delivered to Tripoli, which led to diplomatic conflicts with Ankara on several occasions. General Khalifa Haftar's troops in rival eastern Libya receive their equipment primarily overland via Egypt and were therefore hardly affected by Irini's measures.

The embargo enforcement should now be replaced by the fight against the so-called Russian shadow fleet with sometimes dilapidated oil tankers and changing flags. So far, maritime surveillance aimed at Russia has been an issue primarily in the Baltic and North Seas. In addition, Irini is supposed to take over the observation of submarine cables in the Mediterranean in order to secure this sabotage attributed to Russia. Following the example of the Baltic Sea, an “exchange format” for cooperation in the area of ​​maritime security should also be created in the Mediterranean.

Central to the new Irini mission are access rights in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Accordingly, the German Navy is also allowed to enter Russian ships, for example if there is reasonable suspicion that they are not flying a flag. If the captains refuse such an inspection, Irini can enforce this.

Sea rescue is still not a separate task of the operation, although it is carried out off the Libyan coast, where hundreds of boats leave for Europe every year and thousands of people drown. For its observation tasks, Irini's operational area was moved so far east at Italy's insistence in 2020 that there was hardly any direct contact with migrant boats.

In recent years, as of October 22, only 1,619 people have been rescued from distress at sea by Irini units, the federal government wrote last week in response to a parliamentary question. Like the EU border agency Frontex, Irini reports sighted boats to the coast guard in Tripoli or Tobruk so that the inmates can be brought back to Libya. This policy of “pullbacks” to Libya is criticized by human rights organizations.

The original Irini mandate included training the Libyan coast guard for such operations, but the traffic light government excluded this between 2022 and 2025 due to “human rights concerns.” This exclusion clause is no longer applicable in the current application. He names Egypt, Tunisia and Lebanon as possible partners beyond Libya.

The human rights organization SOS Humanity sharply criticizes the cooperation with Libya and points to serious rights violations against migrants who are held, mistreated and killed in prison-like camps under the control of the Libyan coast guard and allied actors.

Because these are crimes against humanity, the NGO recommends that the Bundestag end Irini's support. Left-wing MP Desiree Becker, who is responsible for her group's motion, also particularly criticizes the possible cooperation with the Libyan coast guard against "nd".

SOS Humanity also points to the final report of the UN expert panel for Libya from March 2026. Accordingly, militias of the Libyan National Army, with the approval of Haftar, smuggled weapons and military material from Libya into Sudan in order to support groups close to the Sudanese Rapid Support Forces.

The AfD and Left parties have submitted counter-motions to the federal government's proposal. Both demand that German participation in Irini be ended with immediate effect. As justification, the AfD points out that the operation has not fulfilled its core task: since the beginning, only 33 suspicious ships have been inspected and embargo cargo has only been confiscated in three cases. The resources released should be used to expand the Bundeswehr and national defense.

The Left rejects the continuation because the EU uses the UN mandates primarily as legitimation for the military presence and to ward off refugees. The now planned expansion to the Russian shadow fleet underlines this “fig leaf character”. The group fundamentally criticizes the EU cooperation with Libya, which is now being expanded to include the unrecognized government in eastern Libya.

The Greens also criticize the operation. Marcel Emmerich, domestic policy spokesman for the Bundestag faction, is calling for an end, but not directly. “You have to seriously ask yourself whether the mission is still making a contribution to conflict de-escalation in Libya or whether it is being used by the neighboring states to ward off people who have no other way out than to flee across the Mediterranean,” Emmerich tells “nd”.

The Bundestag Greens are also calling for state-financed and supported sea rescue in the Mediterranean. Between 2016 and 2026, NGOs documented 79 violent attacks on civilian sea rescue ships, Die Linke points out in its application. Several German organizations were also affected by this.

However, this number is outdated, as Sea-Watch reported on Wednesday: 107 violent incidents have now been counted. There were 26 incidents in 2026 alone, the highest number since the annual statistics began. The Libyan coast guard is responsible in over two thirds of the cases.

Among the 107 cases there are also several involving gun violence. The federal police are entrusted with investigating shots fired at the “Seawatch 5” belonging to the NGO of the same name in May of this year and the “Ocean Viking” belonging to SOS Mediterranee in August 2025. When the investigation is expected to be concluded, “it cannot currently be predicted,” explained the responsible senior public prosecutor in Hamburg in response to nd’s request.

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