Factories, Ports, and Highways: Where Spain’s General Strike Hit Hardest

November 11 left behind a scene not seen in the Spanish State for years: picket lines starting at dawn, blocked entrances to industrial parks, paralyzed transportation, major production centers operating at minimal capacity, and roads blocked in several regions. The general strike, despite the difficulty of extending it to all sectors and despite regional differences, managed to make its presence felt at strategic points throughout the economy.

Initial assessments by the Workers’ Commissions (CCOO) and the General Union of Workers (UGT) point to particularly high participation in industry, the automotive sector, ports, and transportation. The Confederation of Tenants’ Unions, for its part, has highlighted the strike’s nationwide reach; demonstrations took place in more than 100 cities through a network of 1,130 neighborhood strike committees.

Employers’ associations and various government agencies have sought to downplay the day’s impact, while labor unions have emphasized its significance. But beyond the dispute over percentages, there is a reality that is difficult to hide: November 11 succeeded in disrupting the operations of key productive sectors and shifting the social conflict from workplaces to the streets and highways.

An indicator that provides insight into the strike’s impact is the shift in electricity demand. This is not a perfect gauge — it also depends on temperature, economic activity, self-generated power such as rooftop solar, habits, and other factors — but it offers an important clue: when factories, logistics facilities, and other centers of activity reduce or halt production, energy consumption reflects this.

And November 11 sent a significant signal. According to data from grid operator Red Eléctrica compiled by public broadcaster RTVE, at 8 a.m., demand stood at 28,746 megawatts, compared to 31,856 at the same time the previous day: a 9.8 percent decrease. At 11 a.m., demand was 7.46 percent below forecast, according to data released by Red Eléctrica.

The decline was particularly pronounced from 10 a.m. to 11 a.m. The fact-checking outlet Newtral, comparing actual consumption with the average for weekdays over the past month, recorded a drop of nearly 9 percent at the peak of the decline and 6.12 percent at noon.

Usage gradually increased as the day went on. But the trend during the early hours — coinciding with factory shift changes, picket lines at logistics centers, and transportation disruptions — shows that electricity demand dropped significantly precisely when the strike was expected to disrupt productive activity.

Comparing these figures with those from the country’s most recent major general strikes provides further context. On September 29, 2010, during the strike against the labor reform of José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero’s government, electricity demand fell by an average of 14 percent compared to Red Eléctrica’s forecast. Two years later, on March 29, 2012, during the strike against the labor reform of Mariano Rajoy’s government, the drop was 14.84 percent.

The figures for November 11, 2026, are lower than those for either of those days. By this indicator, participation appears to have been lower than during the strikes of 2010 and 2012. This should come as no surprise. The 14-year truce granted to the Rajoy and Sánchez governments by the bureaucratic leaderships of the CCOO and UGT has taken its toll.

After all these years, however, November 11 has once again placed the general strike at the center of social confrontation, and it has done so without being called by the CCOO and UGT. It has also shown that significant reserves of militancy still exist in the industrial, transportation, and logistics sectors, and that they have been reignited by a strike call linking labor demands to the housing crisis.

Participation data allow us to analyze where the strike’s strength was concentrated and which sectors effectively halted their operations. All the data indicate that the impact was most noticeable in manufacturing, ports, and logistics — those sectors with the strongest tradition of union organization and the greatest capacity to paralyze production.

According to the CCOO and UGT’s joint assessment of the first shifts, participation was particularly high in the automotive sector, ports, the meat-processing industry, waste collection, the energy sector, and logistics.

In the automotive sector, 90 percent of workers participated in the strike. The unions highlighted the complete production stoppages at Volkswagen Navarra, SEAT, and Ebro in Barcelona.

The ports were another major focal point of the strike. According to the unions, Algeciras and Valencia recorded 90 percent participation, while disruptions also occurred at the port facilities in Barcelona, Tarragona, and A Coruña. In A Coruña, activity came to a near-complete halt.

In the meat industry, participation reached 85 percent on what was its third day of strike action over the national collective bargaining agreement, which covers 35,000 workers.

Logistics also played a prominent role. In Guadalajara and Illescas — two strategic hubs for the distribution of goods in central Spain — unions estimated participation at around 80 percent.

Street cleaning and garbage collection ground nearly to a halt, with 82 percent participation. Many large cities woke up to find their trash bins full of the previous day’s garbage, which had not been picked up during the early-morning hours.

The energy sector saw 75 percent participation, and the postal service, 35 percent. Participation was more limited in some public services and in health care, retail, and finance. There were notable exceptions, such as the education sector in Madrid, which had 50 percent participation as part of its indefinite strike, and the Catalan education sector, which had similar overall participation, reaching 70 percent in the Barcelona metropolitan area.

Much of the available data also shows that participation was affected by minimum service requirements — staffing levels that the government mandates during strikes — which in certain sectors, such as health care, prevented workers from completely halting operations.

The regional distribution of the strike also offers some insights. Union data and reports published throughout the day agree that participation was highest in Catalonia, Galicia, Asturias, and Aragon, although there was also significant participation in Andalusia, Madrid, and the Valencian Community.

Catalonia was one of the epicenters of the strike. CCOO estimated overall participation at 84 percent in its final report and highlighted 92 percent participation in sectors such as the automotive and transportation industries. Barcelona was left without buses or the metro during the hours when minimum services were not in effect, from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m. Port operations were also affected, and universities closed completely.

According to the CCOO and UGT, Asturias recorded participation of around 75 percent. The impact was particularly significant at large industrial companies such as ArcelorMittal, Thyssen, Fertiberia, and Rioglass, as well as in Gijón’s urban transit system and the logistics sector.

In Madrid the impact was particularly noticeable in transportation and logistics, and operations at Airbus came to a complete halt. The CCOO estimated overall participation at 65 percent, while the metro saw a 54 percent drop in ridership during rush hour, and the city’s EMT buses saw a 63 percent drop.

The Basque Country was one of the regions where industry was hit hardest. Production came to a virtual standstill at companies such as Petronor and CAF, while the workforces at Mercedes and ACB Sestao managed to significantly reduce operations. Also notable were the shutdowns at Irizar and Ulma, which the workers themselves decided on. The strike also spread to the education sector — with 60 percent participation, according to the unions — as well as to retail, sanitation, and outsourced services.

Aragon saw participation of over 70 percent, according to the unions. Companies such as Saica, CAF, and FCC experienced significant work stoppages, with operations at some workplaces coming to a virtual standstill.

Galicia stood out for the impact on industry and ports. The unions reported 100 percent participation at the Alcoa plant in Lugo and a total shutdown at the port of A Coruña. The Galician union CIG’s mobilization in Vigo also saw very high participation.

Andalusia saw significant participation in industry and port operations. The CCOO and UGT estimated industrial participation at around 70 percent, with 90 percent participation in agribusiness and 100 percent at the port of Algeciras. In its final assessment, CCOO also put overall participation in the region at 70 percent.

In the Valencian Community, ports and industry were the main areas affected. The CCOO estimated overall participation at about 60 percent, with significant disruptions to port operations.

At the other end of the spectrum, Extremadura, Castile–La Mancha, and Castile and León were among the regions with the lowest participation during the first shifts, although there were significant pockets of strike activity at certain logistics and industrial centers.

If anything visually characterized November 11, it was the widespread presence of picket lines and roadblocks. The strike was not limited to company gates; it managed to disrupt access to major industrial centers, wholesale markets, logistics hubs, and key transportation routes.

In Catalonia the blockades affected about 20 roads, according to reports published throughout the day. Among them were the AP-7, the A-2, the C-58, and the B-10, as well as Barcelona’s Ronda Litoral. There were also actions at the entrances to industrial parks and in the areas surrounding Mercabarna (Barcelona’s wholesale food market) and the Zona Franca. The picket lines disrupted traffic at various points throughout the metropolitan area.

In Madrid the blockades affected some of the city’s main thoroughfares. There were blockades on the A-1, A-42, and A-5, as well as on the M-30 near Legazpi, Vallecas, and Ventas, and on the M-40 in Moratalaz. Mercamadrid (Madrid’s wholesale food market), the EMT bus depots, and various logistics access points were the sites of picket lines from early in the morning.

In the Valencian Community, the protests affected the V-21, the Ronda Nord, Avenida del Cid, Paiporta, and the access roads to Villareal. Picket lines were also set up at the ports, where activity was severely limited.

In Zamora the police arrested strikers at the municipal bus depots. There were also incidents at Valladolid’s municipal sanitation depots and in Granada, where police intervened against transportation picket lines.

In Málaga, EMT workers staged actions at the municipal bus depots. In Zaragoza, picket lines were set up at the FCC access points to try to paralyze street-cleaning operations. In Guadalajara and other logistics hubs, actions were also organized to disrupt the operations of distribution centers.

Police repression was another feature of the day. At Mercamadrid, police used pepper spray, and more than a dozen people required medical attention. Police also charged picket lines at public transportation depots in Madrid, Málaga, and Granada, and made 50 arrests during the day, with at least as many more once the demonstrations ended.

The roadblocks and picket lines expressed the workers’ determination to make the strike count for something more than just an absence from the workplace. Their goal was to bring the conflict into the public eye, broaden participation, and disrupt the functioning of economic circuits that usually remain hidden.

Beyond participation rates, one way to measure the scale of a general strike is to calculate the volume of economic activity that is not undertaken during the day. The Research Service of the General Council of Economists (CGE) has produced an estimate placing the net loss of GDP at up to 2.1 billion euros in a high-participation scenario of 70 percent.

The calculation is based on average daily output of about 6.76 billion euros. From there, the CGE outlines three scenarios: with 30 percent participation, 2.03 billion euros in goods and services would go unproduced, although the resulting net loss would be about 900 million euros; with 50 percent participation, the initially interrupted production would total 3.38 billion euros, and the net loss would stand at 1.5 billion euros; and with 70 percent participation, the activity not generated that day would total 4.73 billion euros, with an estimated net loss of 2.1 billion euros.

This distinction is important, since not all production halted during a 24-hour strike is permanently lost. Some of it can be recovered later through additional shifts, reorganization of operations, or catching up on orders. But another portion — especially in certain services, transportation, commerce, and production processes subject to deadlines — cannot be fully recovered.

Other estimates published before and during the strike point to a similar potential impact. Professor José Ramón Pin Arboledas of IESE Business School calculated a cost of at least 2 billion euros in GDP, factoring in not only the absence of striking workers but also the effects on workers who could not reach their workplaces or carry out their normal activities.

For its part, the employers’ association CONPYMES estimated a loss of 1.85 billion to 4.56 billion euros, with workers’ participation ranging from 30 to 70 percent. From a different perspective, the Spanish Exporters and Investors Club estimated that, in a scenario of widespread participation, 1.6 billion euros in goods and services intended for export could go unproduced. This figure refers solely to the export sector.

BBVA Research also considered a scenario with an impact of up to 0.2 percent of GDP — equivalent to about 3.5 billion euros — compared to its more moderate baseline estimate of around 0.1 percent. The think tank Funcas, while cautioning that it is difficult to make a definitive estimate before knowing the level of participation, put the potential impact at up to 5 billion euros in a scenario of total shutdown.

In short, the various estimates place the volume of production that could have been affected at roughly 2 billion to 5 billion in the highest-impact scenarios. These are not final recorded losses but calculations of potential impact based on different methodologies and assumptions. They do, however, allow us to gauge the capacity of a general strike to disrupt the economy’s production, distribution, and service networks.

The assessment of November 11 must be approached without triumphalism and without concealing its limitations. Participation was not uniform across all sectors and regions, and electricity consumption data do not allow us to automatically equate its impact with that of the general strikes of 2010 and 2012. Nor, however, can it be reduced to a day of limited participation, as employers’ associations have sought to portray it.

Work stoppages in major industries, disruptions at ports, roadblocks, transportation mobilizations, and the widespread nature of the protests demonstrate that the capacity for collective response has not disappeared during these 14 years without general strikes.

Furthermore, November 11 had an important and novel feature: it linked the labor conflict to the housing crisis, connecting what is happening in the workplaces with a massive youth and social mobilization that has sent shockwaves through the government and the political regime. The demand for living wages, the fight against exorbitant rents, and the condemnation of speculation have made it possible to have an impact in workplaces — which are constrained by the control of union bureaucracies — and to bring in social sectors that do not always take part in traditional union calls to action.

The hundreds of neighborhood strike committees and the experiences of coordination among labor organizations, housing collectives, students, and workers point to a path for expanding this capacity for mobilization.

The challenge is to ensure that all this momentum does not dissipate now that the day of action is over. The assemblies, strike committees, and coordinating bodies that have emerged or been strengthened must cohere this organizing and extend it into the workplaces.

Ensuring that these processes of self-organization develop within workplaces is essential to preventing the leaderships of the CCOO and UGT from imposing another truce on us under a potential new Sánchez government — or a controlled management of the conflict if the right wing comes to power, as it did under Rajoy.

On this issue, militant unionism bears a fundamental responsibility. It must seek the greatest possible unity with the rank and file, members, and delegates of the major unions who don’t go along with their leaderships’ policies, and build synergies and alliances with the housing and youth movements to revolutionize the workplaces.

The experience of 2010 and 2012 also taught us a lesson: a one-day strike, no matter how massive, does not guarantee victory for our demands. What is needed is continuity, organization in workplaces and neighborhoods, and the ability to sustain mobilization regardless of electoral calendars and agreements between union leaderships and governments.

November 11 has shown that the social force exists to impose the movement’s demands, such as rent reductions and the expropriation of large property owners. We must wrest from the government and employers a wage restructuring like the one being fought for in France — with an increase in the minimum wage and across-the-board raises by decree for all workers. We need to coordinate the ongoing struggles and secure victory. We must confront the reactionary agenda — whether implemented by the right or the “progressives” — and overturn rearmament plans and racist immigration policies.

The question that remains open — and which we should debate in the assessment meetings to be held in the coming days — is how to transform all this social force into a sustained movement that operates democratically from the grassroots and that is combative, that can impose real solutions to the housing crisis and the deterioration of living conditions for the working majority, and that can halt — together with the working class and the youth of the continent — the war machine that is spreading across Europe.