BND reform: Not just monitoring the Internet and journalists in the NSA style

dossier

“In the future, the BND should also be able to snorkel data from entire “international telecommunications networks” and query passwords domestically, according to a draft law. This would legalize controversial practices. The federal government and the grand coalition want to allow the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) largely free access to network nodes in Germany and thus legalize a highly controversial practice of the foreign secret service. The BND is likely to monitor the Internet in the NSA style, i.e. using selectors to search the data collected from “international telecommunications networks”, save connection and location data, query passwords and exchange information with foreign secret services such as the NSA...“Article by Volker Briegleb at heise online from June 6th, 2016. See:

• Doctors, activists and internet users: This secret service reform affects us all
  “Intelligence reform is only about threats from “foreign powers” ​​and terror? Not at all. The rules that the Bundestag is currently debating concern us all: when visiting the doctor, in the car repair shop and at the demonstration.
  Terrorism, extremism, espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks, hybrid attacks, destabilization and above all “foreign powers”. Last Thursday in the Bundestag, Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) rattled off in volleys all the threats that, in his opinion, make us urgently need new intelligence laws. (…) The secret service reform, which Chancellery Minister Nina Warken (CDU) called the “biggest amendment to the law of the intelligence services in the history of our country,” is about the very big dangers. That also means: If I'm not a disposable agent controlled from Russia or an undercover Hamas fighter in Germany, it has nothing to do with me. But that's wrong. The secret service reform, which is intended to give the BND and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution – Dobrindt’s quote – “of course” operational capabilities, affects us all. (…)
  The secret service reform concernsDoctors and their patients. It limits confidentiality in the treatment room. (…) The medical profession is missing from the paragraph on “protection of confidentiality relationships” in the draft BND law. According to the draft of the Federal Constitutional Protection Act, a balance should be made: the interest in information versus the interest in confidentiality. (…)
  The secret service reform concernsJournalists and their sources. It undermines the foundations of journalistic work. Like doctors, media professionals are subject to professional secrecy. In order to be able to research grievances and protect their informants, they must guarantee confidentiality. This torpedoes the secret service reform, because it also only offers relative protection. (…) Surveillance by the BND should be possible if those affected are “in connection” with a significant threat. This may mean being in contact with a person from whom relevant information can be obtained. (…)
  The secret service reform concernsClimate activists and sit-blockers. You will be more quickly targeted by the services. The draft law defines very broadly what is “significantly in need of observation” for the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. This applies to a threat, among other things, “when crimes are committed in pursuit of a target” and a defined protected asset is impaired. Criminal offenses can be all sorts of actions. This is the sticker on the street sign that counts as property damage. The formulation that an action is suitable as a threat if the goal is pursued with violence only limits a few things here. (…) The secret service reform concernsAuto repair shops. Their employees become vicarious agents of the services. The planned laws oblige many private actors to work for the German secret services. In addition to providers of digital services and telecommunications, car repair shops and vehicle manufacturers are also explicitly mentioned here. They should provide the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution with telemetry data from cars upon request. (…)
  The secret service reformaffects you when you walk through a mall. Because the services could observe you in the future. (…) Video surveillance is everywhere. And in the future, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should be able to have extensive access to the thousands upon thousands of privately installed surveillance cameras. Anyone who operates private or public video surveillance should in future be obliged by the domestic secret service to pass on the data to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, to transmit stored data to the secret service or to allow them to share the cameras. The prerequisite: a “threat that requires at least considerable observation”. But in the search for the extremist or the disposable agent, countless people would be affected. (…)
  The secret service reform concernseveryone who uses the Internet. Because the BND is actually allowed to snoop and search all transmitted data. (…) The restriction to “foreign” communication also becomes vague, not only because it can hardly be distinguished from domestic communication with 100% certainty. The previous barriers to communication between domestic and foreign countries will be adapted to pure foreign communication, writes the German Lawyers' Association. In the future, exceptions will be added that will allow the BND to look into domestic data traffic - for example in the case of "terrorist, state or international" hacking attacks or if the survey is presumably necessary "to avert a significant threat to a particularly important legal interest." Analysis by Anna Biselli from September 29, 2026 in Netzpolitik.org 
• The people in the country then find themselves in a panopticon: the worst encroachments on fundamental rights in the intelligence services' reform plans
  "On August 12, 2026, the Federal Cabinet decided to reform the law of the intelligence services. The Cabinet itself says that the draft law represents the most extensive and fundamental revision of the legal basis of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) in German history. That is not an exaggeration. However, the new version of the law does not ensure a modernization or better control of intelligence services so much as a massive restructuring of our state a surveillance state. Before the Bundestag decides on the more than 700-page package (BT document 21/7868), the civil rights organization Humanist Union (HU) appeals to the MPs to decide against the reform because it is largely unconstitutional and attacks civil liberties and fundamental rights (...) Without giving real resilience to the rule of law and democracy, the draft (...) ensures a massive expansion of the powers of the intelligence services It is easier to monitor all people in Germany and much more easily abroad - which creates a further step towards a surveillance state - but the services should also be given operational powers, although they are allowed to monitor them at an early stage. This contradicts the requirement of separation and creates ambiguities in the institutional structure of the security authorities. At the same time, these secret services are de facto less subject to political control.Those affected often find out nothing about an intervention and are therefore often unable to effectively exercise their rights themselves. This is precisely why independent, ex officio control is particularly important. In special crisis situations, control, documentation and notification mechanisms are also partially withdrawn (see above). However, the Federal Constitutional Court requires permanent and comprehensive independent control of secret intelligence activities. Intervention requirements and control density must also be aligned with the respective intervention weight. Of course, it is already impossible to control secret services democratically and transparently - this contradicts the principle of a secret service - which makes such services inherently undemocratic. But not strengthening the few options for partial control in line with the increase in the services' competencies would speak for secret services whose leash is becoming so long that it is questionable to what extent they contribute to protecting democracy and the rule of law. Instead, they both seem more threatening. This shows once again that the “Protection of the Constitution” is not being reformed in the constitutional and democratic sense (and probably cannot be reformed), which is why it should be abolished without replacement. This shows a general lack of transparency that is also evident in other places. Because while the Freedom of Information Act, which enables transparency from the state and authorities towards citizens, is being refined, the lack of transparency in the services is being expanded. The reform package, which threatens the freedom of people on German soil, should therefore be rejected.“If the “Protection of the Constitution” will not be abolished, it would be enough to reform the points called for by the Federal Constitutional Court by the end of the year instead of introducing a paradigm shift in surveillance and violence.” Contribution by Philip Dingeldey & Carola Otte from September 14, 2026 at the Humanist Union 
• The Office for the Protection of the Constitution gets more rights: “This will affect Antifa and the climate movement”
  In theInterview by Timm Kühn in the taz online from August 13, 2026 warns Tom Jennissen from the “Security without Surveillance” network that Dobrindt’s “real secret services” will target the left-wing scene:"...Tom Jennissen: We have known that a reform of the secret services was imminent since the Federal Constitutional Court ruled in 2024 that the powers of the secret services were too loosely regulated. But what has now been presented has completely shocked me. This is not only a direct attack on our fundamental rights, it is also forgotten by history: the requirement of separation between the police and secret services is a direct consequence of the Gestapo and the concentration of power in the Nazi state. And now I want to Dobrindt to set up a new secret police (...) That the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should be given operational powers (...) is the biggest breach of taboo. (...) In the future, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should be allowed to break into homes, hack laptops and install state trojans, destroy data storage devices - and all in secret, without judicial control (...) The history of the German secret services clearly shows that for them the enemy is on the left An undercover agent has infiltrated a peaceful group, the Interventionist Left. The Ministry of the Interior will soon be holding a follow-up conference against anti-fascism with the Trump regime, which is persecuting anti-fascists as terrorists. The Federal Agency for Civic Education should focus on “left-wing extremism” again in the future. I have no doubt that in the current shift to the right, this secret police will also affect left-wing and civil society activism. (…) But also environmental and climate activism, where the targeted violation of rules through civil disobedience is part of it. Groups that take actions against arms companies certainly play a role here.Already after the electric attack in Berlin, Dobrindt transparently called for secret services to spy on the left-wing scene. It is therefore to be expected that individual militant actions will be used as justification for this. This is already happening, but in the future the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should combat the scene properly. (…) We cannot wait until the Constitutional Court at some point overturns the project as clearly unconstitutional. This “reform” must not pass. It would of course be very desirable if the powers of the secret services were clearly regulated and controlled. Ultimately, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should be abolished. From the NSU to the AfD, he has failed in dealing with the right-wing threat. What really secures democracy is not a police state or authoritarian state restructuring - but affordable housing, secure jobs and a well-financed education and health system.See also:
  
  • Secret service reform: historical oblivion and dangerous
    "This reform is overdue. For too long, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the BND have operated on a legally questionable basis. The Federal Constitutional Court also criticized this and gave the Bundestag until the end of this year to improve control of the BND.
    The government is following the demand from Karlsruhe - and is missing the mark by a long way. In its approximately 730-page draft law, it sets out what “real” intelligence work and its control should look like in the future. At the same time, she is using the Karlsruhe judges' reprimand to turn the basic principles of post-war German democracy on their head. And that is not only dangerously forgetful of history, but also a threat to civil society and the basic rights of everyone. (…) It was the Allies who imposed the separation requirement on the Federal Republic as a historical lesson from National Socialism. Never again should a secret, political state police operate on German soil. The secret services should therefore limit themselves to collecting information. And only the police should be allowed to intervene directly. The federal government now wants to significantly weaken this separation. (…) The Office for the Protection of the Constitution, on the other hand, could classify a threat as “significantly in need of observation” if someone conceals their actions, for example by encrypting their communication. In the future, it will also be sufficient to commit minor crimes, such as sticking stickers or tearing down posters, writes the Society for Civil Rights. And during the observation, those affected usually do not find out about the measure. The Office for the Protection of the Constitution has already monitored political opposition figures in the past. In the future, political activists and those around them must expect to be targeted even more quickly by the domestic secret service - which will then be even more powerful. (…) In fact, from now on, an Independent Control Council (UKRat) with just nine members will control both services.The G10 Commission will be dissolved and the Federal Data Protection Commissioner will also be left out. Secret services primarily process information, and the issue of data protection is obviously too annoying. (…) Reporters Without Borders (…) point out that for France and the Netherlands, intelligence work and protection of sources are not a contradiction. And in British intelligence control there is a “stakes advocate” who represents the interests of people affected by intelligence measures. Comparable provisions to strengthen the protection of fundamental rights are usually sought in vain in the federal government's draft law. We can therefore only hope that the members of the Bundestag do not allow themselves to be overwhelmed by the “absolute milestone in the German security architecture” (Alexander Dobrindt) and make improvements.” Contribution by Daniel Leisegang from August 12, 2026 at Netzpolitik.org 
  • “I state: the government wants to introduce a secret police in order to have hostile domestic terrorist activities thwarted by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, while its interior minister wants to hold a conference with the MAGA regime AGAINST “anti-fascists” in Germany in September.
    I want to know whether you actually want to screw us over?“Post by Silka Lem from August 13, 2026 on bsky 
• More powers for intelligence services must not jeopardize constitutionally protected patient confidentiality
  “Doctors and psychotherapists must be exempt from intelligence surveillance and included in the circle of absolutely protected professional groups. This is what the KBV is demanding in view of the federal government's plans to give the intelligence services more powers in the fight against threats. The federal cabinet passed a corresponding bill on Wednesday…”Report from August 13, 2026 from the National Association of Statutory Health Insurance Physicians , see also:
  • Amendment to intelligence law is intended to simplify wiretapping operations:Will practices soon be threatened with eavesdropping?
    “A potential risk person is sitting in the waiting room. For days, the domestic secret service has been listening to the practice telephone, checking incoming emails and decrypting the patient's data - probably not just his. The amendment to intelligence law can now make such a scenario easier. The German Medical Association sees this as a frontal attack on medical professional secrecy.
    Will government eavesdropping on those subject to professional secrecy such as doctors soon be permitted? If the draft law from the Federal Ministry of the Interior as part of the reform of intelligence law goes, then yes. The cabinet decided on this in August. This means that in the future it will be easier for confidential conversations with patients to be intercepted and practices to be entered secretly. With the amendment to the law, the government wants to expand the rights of the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Federal Intelligence Service in order to be able to react better and more quickly to increasing threats to the state and the population.
    Planned regulation jeopardizes treatment
    In the draft presented, the medical right to remain silent would be undermined and the area of ​​confidentiality between doctors and patients, which requires protection, would be violated.criticized the German Medical Association (BÄK) in a statement . Instead of adequately protecting doctors against the means of the intelligence services, the government grants the services “extensive powers, such as listening to or recording non-publicly spoken words and secretly entering residential and business premises,” according to the BÄK…”Article by Angela Moneckefrom August 12, 2026 in the Medical Tribune online 
• Reform of the intelligence services: BND should have access to car data and vulnerabilities
  “The BND and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should become “real secret services”. The economy warns against the passing on of zero-day gaps and interventions in IT systems…”Report by Friedhelm Greis from August 12, 2026 at Golem 
• Secret service reform: “The protection of journalists is being systematically dismantled”
  “The German secret services should get new rules. This also affects the work of journalists in Germany and abroad. Maximilian Jung from Reporters Without Borders explains in an interview why the BND could monitor media workers more easily in the future and what this has to do with freedom of the press.
  One of the most important requirements for journalistic work is confidentiality: sources must be able to rely on the fact that their communication with media professionals is secure. Journalists need protection for sensitive research when they communicate with interlocutors around the world. But this protection is at risk due to the planned secret service reform for the BND and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution, warns the organization Reporters Without Borders.
  We talk to Maximilian Jung about this aspect. As an advocacy speaker at Reporters Without Borders (RSF), he advocates for freedom of the press and information worldwide. He researches and works against state surveillance of journalists and the use of spy software. In the interview he explains how the secret service reform affects the work of journalists and what could be done better…”Interview by Anna Biselli from August 11, 2026 in Netzpolitik 
• Secret Service Act: Excessive, uncontrolled and non-transparent: “A liberal democracy cannot afford this unbalanced and dangerous mixture” 
  "The federal government wants to give the secret services new powers to an unprecedented extent. At the same time, it weakens the rights of those affected, independent supervision and opportunities for transparency.. (...) The draft law from the Federal Ministry of the Interior (...) implements some binding requirements of the Federal Constitutional Court and introduces independent prior control for certain intrusive measures. At the same time, it expands the powers of the Federal Intelligence Service (BND) and the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) to an unprecedented extent. This stands Significantly limited rights of those affected, weakened control and an almost comprehensive withdrawal of freedom of information (…) The draft law shifts essential responsibilities from the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection and Freedom of Information (BfDI) and the G10 Commission to the Independent Control Council (UKRat). I: Independence, resources, access to all relevant information and the ability to enforce rights in the event of a conflict are crucial for efficient and strong control. This is exactly where the draft falls short of what is absolutely necessary. The UK Council will not be able to counteract a denied right of access.(…) In addition to the historically unprecedented expansion of the powers of the intelligence services and the restructuring of supervision, the public would also remain without information about the practice of the new rules for years. The Control Council's first public report for its new tasks should cover the years 2028 to 2030 and should therefore not be published until 2031 at the earliest. (…) In addition, the Federal Chancellery or the Federal Ministry of the Interior should be able to prohibit reports in whole or in part - including to the Parliamentary Control Committee. This is incompatible with the idea of ​​independence. In the event of tension and defense, the draft aims to further reduce control and allow for compromises in data maintenance, documentation and logging. In an acute crisis, flexibility in action is certainly necessary. But without reliable records, ongoing supervision is not the only thing that becomes more difficult. A later examination by courts, parliament and committees of inquiry also becomes impossible. The new “consent case” of the BND law goes even further: It is intended to enable extensive special powers and reduced controls without the Bundestag deciding on the exceptional case as such. This is a constitutionally questionable shift of power away from the elected parliament. The BfDI will lose its responsibility for individual submissions from those affected immediately upon entry into force at the beginning of 2027, while the Control Council will not process such requests until 2029. (…) The transfer of the supervisory function is poorly regulated or not regulated at all. The proposed exchange option between BfDI and UKRat is completely inadequate.(…) The draft bill also affects the Freedom of Information Act, in addition to the worsening measures envisaged by the coalition committee. The intelligence services are already exempt from having to provide citizens with information. In the future, this area exception should also explicitly cover your supervisory authorities and the UK Council. (…) There is no case-by-case examination of whether publication actually endangers a security interest. (…) Freedom of information enables journalists, scientists and civil society to examine government actions. Since those affected can hardly sue because of the secrecy, public control is particularly important. If the state gives the services unprecedentedly more powers, weakens specialist supervision and then massively restricts access to information, a dangerous legitimacy deficit arises for the constitutional state. (…) The constitutional state can be defensive and still limit its power. The trust in the important work of its intelligence services that is necessary for a free society can only come about through clear laws, effective controls and comprehensible (public) accountability. The draft bill completely misses this balance.” Guest article by Ulrich Kelber from July 22, 2026 at Netzpolitik.org and:
  • The BND is arming itself: The Federal Data Protection Commissioner Specht-Riemenschneider is sounding the alarm about the planned secret service reform. She considers it highly unconstitutional
    "If one were to translate the criticism of the Federal Commissioner for Data Protection, Louisa Specht-Riemenschneider, of the planned secret service reform from official German into everyday language, it would probably mean: Are you completely stupid and what do you actually do for a living?! Or to summarize the content: Citizens are left alone with a completely upgraded secret service. Chancellor Friedrich Merz (CDU) and Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) would like to have "real secret services", which are not only monitor, but also carry out actions. Dobrindt wants to push the 700-page bill through the cabinet over the summer break, and the deadlines for statements are correspondingly short. Nevertheless, Germany's top data protection officer has it all: Specht-Riemenschneider's authority literally writes about the planned changes to the law: "The present draft is accompanied by a massive expansion of powers for the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV) and the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), which in turn is in clear contradiction to the restriction of the rights of those affected. This is coupled with a restriction of effective control." Both raise clear doubts about constitutional conformity. The draft law does not meet the requirement for a balance between security and civil liberties. Specht-Riemenschneider's agency is so far the only one with a complete overview of all intelligence services and federal police. In a sense, she is an advocate for the citizens. Those affected can also go there if they want to know whether they may be being monitored and how this complies with telecommunications secrecy and data protection.(…) Specht-Riemenschneider’s authority fears “unacceptable restrictions on control and fundamental rights”. (…) The data protection officer is not alone in her criticism. The Federal Security Office BSI, the Society for Freedom Rights GFF and the Critical Infrastructure Working Group have also already criticized the proposed reform. The federal government counters the criticism with reference to the “serious security situation”. “We want to work on an equal footing with “other European intelligence services.” Article by Gareth Joswig from July 23, 2026 in the taz online 
  • See also the dossier:Union wants to abolish the Freedom of Information Act – and return to the era of “official secrecy”.and the message before:
• Attack on the Basic Law? Dobrindt wants to allow domestic secret service raids 
  “Interior Minister Dobrindt is pushing forward a radical reform of intelligence law. Agents from the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should even be allowed to search apartments.
  Federal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU) is pushing ahead with a reorganization of intelligence law that will grant the German secret services extensive operational powers. However, the plan, which is due to pass the Federal Cabinet on August 13th, is met with significant constitutional concerns. Because Dobrindt wants to break a Federal Republic taboo: agents of the domestic secret service, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (BfV), should be given the right to enter and search apartments in acutely dangerous situations. (…)
  Raids by agents: breaking the rule of separation
  In practice, the new proposal would mean a weakening of one of the most important principles of the post-war German order: the requirement of separation between the police and secret services. Searching apartments, for example, was previously reserved for the police, who acted under judicial supervision and were bound by the Code of Criminal Procedure. The Basic Law guarantees the inviolability of the home and thus sets high hurdles for intervention. If constitutional protection officers were allowed to break into apartments, this limit would be exceeded.(…)Furthermore, the services should be allowed to specifically change information as part of so-called protective measures in order to disrupt sabotage plans. (…)
  System change in intelligence law
  The Interior Ministry recently published oneDraft bill for “super secret services” . This was already a sign of a system change in intelligence law. For example, it envisages degrading the Federal Office for Information Security (BSI) to a supplier for government cyber attacks: security gaps should not be closed, but rather kept open for secret service hacks…”Article by Stefan Krempl from July 20, 2026 in heise news 
• Mass surveillance and hacking: The BND is to get new, powerful tools
  "... It is almost as certain as the amen in church: With every new legislative period comes the demand for further expansion of secret service surveillance. The Federal Intelligence Service (BND) is currently being presented with its wish list. (...) The secret service should be allowed to store and search through both traffic data and the content of mass intercepted communications for up to six months. At the German Internet node DE-CIX in Frankfurt/Main, the BND is now allowed to store and search outgoing data traffic in addition to incoming data traffic The planned new law is also intended to open completely different doors that would allow the secret service to actively hack and sabotage. The secret service would then be able to penetrate networks and take part in active hacking attacks if the BND does not cooperate voluntarily. According to the FAZ, BND people should also be able to secretly break into apartments will bring clarity. But one thing is certain: all of these surveillance measures are secret, which makes legal protection for those affected almost impossible. The core control of these powerful instruments should lie with the National Security Council, which is located in the Chancellery. If it sees a “special intelligence situation” or a “systematic threat” and the Parliamentary Control Committee agrees, the secrets can get started. (…)
  Targeted hacking or sabotage is a crystal-clear power of intervention and is therefore far removed from the educational measures for which the BND was created, but dangerously close to the prohibition of violence in the Basic Law, which of course also binds the foreign secret service. (…)
  Hardly or only poorly controlled secret bodies with billions in budget and such powerful tools should not exist in a parliamentary democracy. Especially not when they have proven time and again in their history that they do not inform the control committees about technical issues and operations at all or only incompletely. (…)
  The German Journalists' Association is protesting and sees freedom of the press at risk following the new plans that have been announced in advance. In order to analyze the bill, which is almost certainly extensive, in more detail, it must first be available. It cannot be ruled out that this time again only a simulation of association participation will take place.” Contribution by Constanze Kurz from January 12, 2026 at Netzpolitik.org 
• Draft of the new BND law: editorial secrecy in danger
  “The German Association of Journalists calls on the Federal Government to protect journalists from spying on their electronic communications by the Federal Intelligence Service.
  The reason is a report by NDR, WDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung, according to which the powers of the German foreign secret service are to be expanded through a reform of the BND law. In the future, the BND should be able to read and save the contents of emails and chat messages that run via the Frankfurt internet node DE-CIX. This would affect all communication between Germany and abroad. Emails that German editorial teams exchange with foreign informants could legally be spied on by the BND. “That would mean the end of editorial secrecy and the protection of informants,” warns DJV federal chairman Mika Beuster.
  It is also planned to relax the protection status of journalists. Beuster: "The protection status is not absolute. Softening it is tantamount to abolishing it." If the reform draft comes to the Bundestag, the legislature would have to say a clear no. “Otherwise press freedom is in great danger,” says the DJV chairman.”DJV press release from January 9th, 2026 to
  • Draft of the new BND law: more storage, more monitoring, more hacking
    “The BND should become more independent of US secret services. According to information from NDR, WDR and SZ, its powers should be significantly expanded - for example in terms of the duration and extent of storing Internet data streams. (…)
    The Chancellery would like to legally regulate this monitoring of Internet communication by revising the BND law - and at the same time significantly expand the BND's powers.This emerges from a draft law that is available to WDR, NDR and Süddeutsche Zeitung .
    According to this, the BND should in future be able to store and evaluate data traffic that passes through data collection points such as the Frankfurt Internet exchange for up to six months - and not just the metadata such as IP addresses, as before, but also the content of the communication. The aim is not only to clarify communications that come from abroad and lead abroad. Internet traffic that travels from Germany to other countries should also be allowed to be checked in the future. (…)
    The plans for more comprehensive storage of data from strategic intelligence provide material for political discussions in particular. Because it's about storing around 30 percent of data traffic. In addition to the duration and extent of permitted storage, what is also new is the draft of a new, two-stage procedure for searching the content: First, the BND should collect and store data, and then in a second step - called "inspection" - view the contents of emails or chats. So far, the BND has only been allowed to use a search term as a filter in future communications.
    The project is reminiscent of data retention, which has been the subject of debate in Germany for years. According to the paper, the lawyers from the Chancellery believe that this is not comparable. According to their argument, under the planned BND practice, not all providers in Germany would be obliged to store all connection data, but only certain data traffic would be recorded at selected locations…”Report by Manuel Bewarder, NDR/WDR and Florian Flade, WDR on January 8th, 2026 on tagesschau.de 
• More powers: espionage, sabotage – explosive draft of the BND law
  "... The draft, which is available to WDR, NDR and SZ, shows: In the future it will be about more than just espionage. The secret service should also be allowed to carry out sabotage. (...) So far, the BND has only been allowed to obtain and evaluate information. That should change. The spies should also be allowed to take operational action in the future. That means: They will also be allowed to carry out active actions to protect the Federal Republic. For example, sabotage to weaken opposing forces or cyber operations to render weapon systems harmless. (…) According to the Chancellor's Office, the BND should be allowed to carry out such actions if the National Security Council declares a special security situation, which is described as a "special intelligence situation" with a "systematic threat". Then Parliament should also be involved: The Parliamentary Control Board (PKGr) would have to agree to the assessment of the situation with a two-thirds majority, according to the paper. (…) In the event of cyber attacks, the BND should be allowed to actively fight back, for example by redirecting data streams and even attacking IT infrastructure that is used for such attacks. The BND should be allowed to use “appropriate means” to fend off suspicious drones over its properties. In the future, the service will also be able to request data about vehicles, such as location data or routes traveled, from manufacturers or workshops. The use of facial recognition software should also be permitted. In order to be able to install spy software on target people's computers, the BND should also be allowed to secretly break into homes.The BND spies should also be allowed to attach tracking technology to enemy devices or weapon systems - or to manipulate them so that they are no longer functional. This could, for example, concern rocket technology or centrifuges that are to be delivered to Iran. (…) What is also new is that human sources, known as intelligence connections (NDV), should be allowed to commit certain crimes abroad if this is necessary for their source work. (…) A planned change could cause the biggest controversy. It can be found in the first paragraph of the draft. It says: “The BND is the civil and military foreign intelligence service of the Federal Republic of Germany.” That sounds banal. However, this would legally define for the first time that the BND is the German military foreign intelligence service. (…) It is unclear whether the final BND law will ultimately fulfill the wishes of the Chancellery. (…) The federal government says it wants to get the law passed quickly next year. Time is of the essence.” WDR contribution by Manuel Bewarder and Florian Flade from December 18, 2025 at tagesschau.de 
• Against surveillance by the BND: RSF, GFF and others are going to the European Court of Human Rights
  “Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the Society for Freedom Rights (GFF) are filing a complaint against the Federal Intelligence Service Act (BND Act) with the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR). In doing so, the organizations are reacting to inadequate reforms of the law, which does not sufficiently take the protection of media professionals into account. RSF and GFF expect the decision to be a fundamental judgment that will not only have an impact on the legal situation in Germany, but also have an impact on the other member states of the Council of Europe. "The BND law still enables comprehensive surveillance of media professionals, especially outside of Germany, and thus endangers freedom of the press. RSF is therefore appealing to the European Court of Human Rights, which is supposed to review the BND law. The international requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights for the protection of freedom of the press and information must also be observed in Germany. There are serious protection gaps that must be closed" (...)
  In the opinion of RSF and GFF, the German foreign secret service is violating several fundamental and human rights in accordance with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The requirements in the BND Act do not adequately protect against violations of Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private and family life), Article 10 (freedom of information and the press) and Article 13 (right to an effective complaint). Media professionals in and outside Germany are exposed to surveillance measures that do not meet the requirements developed by the ECtHR in its case law (…)
  Anyone who suspects they have been monitored must have an effective way to request an independent review. But the BND law does not do justice to this.  "The Federal Constitutional Court did not want to decide on the matter whether the Bundestag had complied with the standards set by the court itself for the law of foreign intelligence services. This is very unfortunate - because the law contains more violations of fundamental rights than ever. (...)
  In addition to Reporters Without Borders and the GFF, other media professionals are leading the ECHR complaint, including Meron Estefanos (Sweden), Goran Lefkov (North Macedonia), Dragana Pećo (Serbia) and Kerem Schamberger (Germany). The independent journalist and former RSF scholarship holder Elif Akgül (Türkiye) is also going to the ECHR with us. She has been in custody in Istanbul since the end of February 2025 on charges of membership in the banned Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). She denies this accusation and RSF calls for her immediate release. This shows that even if we are talking about the German BND, media professionals worldwide are affected…”RSF press release from March 11, 2025 (“Complaint against the BND law at the ECHR”), see also
  • Complainants against the BND law and everything in the dossierCriticism of the BND law Reporters Without Borders – more on that below
• Databroker Files: Data brokers sell the location data of millions of people in Germany. They were allegedly collected for advertising purposes only
  "But research by netzpolitik.org and BR shows: The data can even be used to spy on employees of the government, military and secret services. (…) Early in the morning the person leaves their home, somewhere in Bavaria. They get in the car and head to work. The journey ends in the parking lot of an area to which only a few people have access. It is the Mangfall barracks in Bad Aibling. The Federal Intelligence Service (BND) operates a branch here. It is a Location that made headlines ten years ago, because the NSA may also be monitoring the Internet from here. At least that's what documents published by the whistleblower Edward Snowden showed in 2014. After the NSA scandal, the cooperation was suspended, but in 2016 the German media reported: The joint espionage by the BND and the US foreign secret service is continuing (...) This is not information from a data leak that we found on the Darknet about data from the advertising industry, which we received on a public online marketplace - free of charge. The data reveals the movement profiles of tens of thousands of telephones in military and secret service areas. In samples, we examined the paths of numerous people who apparently work for secret services, security agencies, federal ministries or the military. where NSA agents are also said to be working (…) It has been known for years that data traders sell the location data of millions of people.This was shown by research from the USA, Norway, the Netherlands and Switzerland. Researchers warn urgently: The advertising industry's data collection is also a danger in Europe. But the legislature has not yet sufficiently taken into account the risk of espionage caused by advertising tracking. Now research by netzpolitik.org and BR shows: Mass surveillance through cell phone tracking is also happening in Germany. A data set that we evaluated contains 3.6 billion location data from millions of people. They come from cell phone apps and were apparently collected for advertising purposes. We obtained the data set from a data marketplace. The marketplace is operated by the German company Datarade from Berlin. Data traders from all over the world can register there and offer their data. If you want to contact the dealers, you just have to create an account on the marketplace. A professional email address is sufficient for this. It should also be easy for secret services to make use of the data. (…) It is no secret that foreign secret services are active in Germany. As Edward Snowden's revelations showed, the US NSA not only acted as a partner of the BND, but also monitored the Chancellor's cell phone itself. As several media outlets reported in 2016, the NSA continues to spy together with the BND in Bad Aibling, for example. (…) However, the data from the advertising industry is not just a potential danger for the German secret services and security authorities. They can also be a means of spying on your own. The technical term for this is ADINT, which stands for “advertising-based intelligence”; in German: advertising-based insights.If data markets make the sale of location data as easy as possible, wouldn’t our authorities also be happy to take advantage of this themselves? We don't know for sure, but some people think the probability is high. (…) A clear yes to ADINT through German services is expressed by Bundestag member Roderich Kiesewetter (CDU), deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Control Committee. (…) Experts from civil society have been calling for stricter rules against the escalating business with personal data for years. Authorities in the USA and the EU must act urgently, demanded the Irish human rights organization ICCL in a report in 2023..." Research by Sebastian Meineck and Ingo Dachwitz on July 16, 2024 in Netzpolitik.org (“How data traffickers endanger Germany’s security”), see also:
  • Databroker Files: ADINT – dangerous espionage via online advertising
    “The technology behind online advertising can be misused for surveillance and espionage. To make these risks visible, researchers coined the term ADINT seven years ago. Our most recent research with the BR shows that your warnings were justified, but the danger is still underestimated…”Contribution by Sebastian Meineck and Ingo Dachwitz from July 19, 2024 in Netzpolitik 
  • Important:How to stop location tracking on your cell phone
    “The phones of millions of people in Germany tell the advertising industry exactly where they are. During our research with BR, we found tons of motion profiles from unsuspecting users, recorded by cell phone apps. This can be stopped with just a few simple steps…”Contribution by Sebastian Meineck and Ingo Dachwitz from July 16, 2024 in Netzpolitik 
• Draft bill for BND reform temporarily halted after widespread criticism
  “The traffic light government wanted to have its secret services better controlled, it promised in the coalition agreement. Two years later, the SPD, Greens and FDP proposed a new law for the Federal Intelligence Service (BND). However, not of their own free will, but following a ruling by the Federal Constitutional Court in 2022. The preliminary steps already show that proposals for better control are not wanted at all: the Federal Chancellery gave the relevant associations 24 hours to read and comment on the 88-page paper to comment on the draft law. This is impossible even for intelligence experts. Now the same Chancellery is withdrawing the draft law, apparently because of disagreement about the Independent Control Council. He should keep an eye on the BND as the highest federal authority. However, the judges do not want to let the Bundestag's intelligence inspectors look at their cards. The new Independent Control Council has created a new black box that is also difficult to control. Abolishing the secret services would also be a solution for this.”Comment by Matthias Monroy from August 28, 2023 in ND online (“New Black Box for the BND”)
• BND law: Federal Chancellery simulates association participation with a 24-hour deadline 
  “The Federal Chancellery has given associations just one day to comment on the new BND law. Reporters Without Borders and the Society for Civil Rights are outraged. They accuse the Federal Chancellery of secrecy - and publish the draft bill.
  The Federal Chancellery has given associations a deadline of just over 24 hours to comment on the 88-page draft of the new BND law. The non-governmental organization Reporters Without Borderspublishes the document  and, together with the Society for Freedom Rights (GFF), criticizes the actions of the responsible authorities as insufficient participation of associations and a lack of involvement of the public.
  The Federal Chancellery is currently working on a further reform of the BND Act (BNDG), which lays the legal basis for the work of the German foreign intelligence service BND. It is the third change to the law since the Snowden revelations around ten years ago. According to Reporters Without Borders, an initial examination of the planned changes is already raising doubts about the constitutionality of the new regulations. “The legislature is once again missing the opportunity for a long-overdue and holistic reform of the BNDG, which belongs on the solid ground of the constitution,” said Reporters Without Borders (ROG) in a press release…”Contribution by Markus Reuter from August 23, 2023 in network politics , see also dju:
  • ver.di criticizes the Chancellery for its 24-hour deadline for commenting on the BND law: an insane deadline
    “ver.di federal board member Christoph Schmitz: “Compliance with freedom of the press and fundamental rights seems to have been reduced to a minor matter”
    The Chancellery only gave affected associations 24 hours to comment on the draft bill for the revision of the BND law published yesterday. The German Union of Journalists (dju) in ver.di was also invited to comment. Christoph Schmitz, member of the ver.di federal board responsible for media, comments on the short deadline:"The BND law does not adequately protect the special democratic rights of journalists. Therefore, the law has been repeatedly rejected in the past by the Federal Constitutional Court as inadequate and the legislature has been ordered to make improvements to protect fundamental rights. Clearly, the law on the BND is a complex matter. After the Federal Chancellery took twelve months to revise the law, those affected and their associations are now given 24 hours to comment - an absurd deadline…”dju press release from August 22, 2023 
• New constitutional complaint against the BND law by Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the Society for Freedom Rights (GFF) 
  "Reporters Without Borders (RSF) and the Society for Freedom Rights (GFF) have once again filed a constitutional complaint against the BND law with the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG) in Karlsruhe. Together with journalists and human rights activists, they are defending themselves against the global surveillance of the German foreign secret service. After the first complaint from both organizations, the court declared large parts of the BND's foreign surveillance to be in violation of fundamental rights in a groundbreaking ruling in May 2020. However, that too The reformed BND law does not meet the requirements of Karlsruhe. In addition, the legislature has included new unconstitutional regulations in the law. "Almost ten years have passed since the first revelations that revealed the extent of global surveillance by secret services. Little has changed in surveillance practice. We are still fighting for a minimum of protection for journalists from unlawful wiretapping - including from German authorities such as the BND," said Helene Hahn, consultant for Internet freedom at RSF. "The mass surveillance and unrestricted expansion of the powers of the intelligence services must be put to an end. The legislature has so far failed to achieve this."
  Journalists are still not adequately protected from surveillance by the BND. This particularly applies to confidential communication with your sources. Journalistic research results are also not clearly taboo for the BND. While German media professionals enjoy greater protection, journalists from the EU and non-EU countries are even easier surveillance targets for the BND. (…)
  Ruling from Karlsruhe ignored in the reform of the BND law
  Announced in May 2020Judgment of the Federal Constitutional Court clarified a fundamental question that is important for international human rights protection: the federal government's commitment to the Basic Law is "not limited to German national territory." Basic rights such as telecommunications secrecy (Article 10 GG) and freedom of the press (Article 5 GG) must also be respected by German authorities abroad. Accordingly, it should be forbidden to monitor foreign media professionals at will, and the passing on of research results to foreign secret services should also be subject to strict conditions. The confidential communication of journalists should be protected by law. RSF described the ruling at the time as oneMilestone in protecting press freedom . However, in the subsequent reform of the BND law, the legislators of the former grand coalition ignored the requirements of the Federal Constitutional Court. (…) On the one hand, the protection of data that arises in the context of journalistic confidentiality relationships and during communication with contact persons is inadequate. According to the BND law, communication between journalists and a source may not be monitored, but communication via this source may be monitored. This means that the content of emails, for example, would not be recorded, but traffic data - which provides information about who communicates with whom, when, how and for how long - is not protected. It is precisely the amount and connection of such metadata that provides deep insights into a person's activities and preferences. It is also worrying that the protection of the confidentiality relationship only extends to the actual communication process. Research results are therefore not protected and could give the BND insight into publication intentions…”Report from January 26, 2023 at Reporters Without Borders 
• BND law: Federal intelligence service receives more surveillance powers than ever before 
  “The Federal Intelligence Service is now allowed to hack Internet providers and listen to them almost indefinitely. The Bundestag and Bundesrat have passed the new BND law. A few years ago, such secret service powers were a scandal. Non-governmental organizations announce legal action. Extract and process unimaginably large amounts of data. Hack internet providers like Google or Facebook. Monitor billions of people, including nationals. All of this was a scandal when Edward Snowden revealed the global surveillance of Western secret services eight years ago. The German secret service BND can now do all of this legally. Yesterday evening the Bundestag passed the new BND law. The governing parties CDU/CSU and SPD voted in favor, the entire opposition voted against. Today the Federal Council approved it. Next, the Federal President signs the law and it then comes into force. (…) Thenew law , that of the Bundestagwas only minimally changed , once again gives the BND immense surveillance powers. The BND is now allowed to intercept huge amounts of data, up to “30 percent of the transmission capacity of all existing global telecommunications networks”. This fantasy limit is far more than the BND can ever achieve. Klaus Landefeld, operator of the Internet node DE-CIX, says: “You can give it as a gift and not put any limits on it at all.” The BND is now allowed to hack communications providers, “even without their knowledge.” This affects all services abroad, i.e. pretty much everything in the Internet age, including Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon and Microsoft. In this way, Germany legitimizes the fact that all 192 other countries also hack.The BND can now also wiretap Germans. The law protects “only individual communications from natural persons”; everything else is defined as communication with machines. This gives the foreign secret service comprehensive access to inventory, traffic and content data, including from Germans. A supposed oneAnonymization through hash values describes Landefeld as ineffective and “ridiculous”. The conclusion of the new law is once again: spying on friends will be legalized and expanded. Experts criticize the regulations in clear terms. Several experts in the Interior Committee warned that the law would likely end up back before the Federal Constitutional Court…”Contribution by Andre Meister from March 26, 2021 at Netzpolitik 
• Reporters Without Borders: Criticism of the BND law – #NotYourSource campaign 
  "With the current campaign #NotYourSource, RSF is calling for an end to the surveillance of foreign journalists. The German Bundestag now has the opportunity to make appropriate changes to the new BND draft law and to set an example for human rights internationally. Our call to MPs on Twitter, Facebook and Instagram. Supporters are invited to share the call or contact your MPs by email. (…) RSF's core demands: The BND law must comprehensively provide for confidentiality relationships, for example between media professionals and their sources Protect surveillance. This protection must include all information and data related to journalistic work. This includes personal data (names, telephone numbers, IP addresses, etc.) as well as research material and traffic data, such as email addresses or subject lines of those involved. Mass surveillance without suspicion must be limited to press freedom and civil rights Communication networks and the search terms with which the BND combs through them must be narrowed down and checked for their appropriateness. Only specific indications of suspected threats to the state can justify the violation of confidentiality relationships. The supervision of the German secret services must be strengthened and given appropriate powers in order to be able to review the mechanisms for the protection of fundamental rights and uncover abusive surveillance.(…) Although the government draft provides for requirements to protect confidential relationships, it specifically only wants to protect some selected data. Accordingly, journalistic research results, for example, would not be clearly taboo for BND employees. The draft also makes no provision for protecting traffic data that, for example, provides information about who spoke to whom, when and for how long. However, this data makes up the majority of the information collected. Since the revelations by NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden, it has been known how important they are for the work of the secret services. If such data were passed on unfiltered to other secret services, it could put media professionals in many countries at risk...” Protest call by Reporters Without Borders from February 2021 
• BND law: Federal government decides on secret service surveillance like in the Snowden era
  "The Federal Intelligence Service is supposed to hack mobile phone and internet providers and monitor the communication of all customers. The federal government has passed a corresponding draft law. The secret service continues to grow and will receive over a billion euros for the first time next year. (…) We published the first draft in September and the second draft in November. Experts criticized the drafts: think tanks, journalists, press freedom NGOs, Internet associations and the Federal Data Protection Commissioner. Despite the opportunity to comment, the government has not changed much. (…) The foreign secret service is allowed to In the future, they will be able to hack not only individual people and devices, but also servers and service providers, as well as entire mobile phone and internet providers (…) The secret service has even deliberately circumvented similar restrictions in the past The secret service collects huge amounts of inventory and traffic data and uses it to map connection networks. The foreign secret service is actually not allowed to monitor Germans, but the new law allows extensive exceptions for “machine-to-machine communication” or even rudimentary “unrecognizable” data such as hashes of telephone numbers. When Edward Snowden proved that secret services were acting this way, it was a global scandal. Today the federal government is legalizing this activity.And expands it: In the Snowden year of 2013, the BND received 531 million euros in tax money, next year it will receive more than a billion euros for the first time. (…) Supervision of the BND is already fragmented. In the future, a new authority will be added, the “Independent Control Council”. Many experts and also the Federal Data Protection Commissioner had called for this task to be given to the highest data protection authority. The SPD chairwoman Saskia Esken had also made it a condition that the Federal Data Protection Commissioner take on this function: "This is a very, very important condition. [...] This is definitely one of the things that we will demand." That didn't happen. The SPD ministries did not enforce this and still agreed today. The bill is now coming to the Bundestag. Since sic