Politics · de.indymedia · · 49m
Doctors, activists and internet users: This secret service reform affects us all
Deutsch (original) · Auto-translated to English
Symbolbild · Norbert Nagel / CC BY-SA 3.0 · Wikimedia Commons
Intelligence reform is only about threats from “foreign powers” and terror? Not at all. The rules that the Bundestag is currently debating concern us all: when visiting the doctor, in the car repair shop and at the demonstration.
Terrorism, extremism, espionage, sabotage, cyberattacks, hybrid attacks, destabilization and above all “foreign powers”. Volley-likehttps://dserver.bundestag.de/btp/21/21096.pdf#P.11791">rattledFederal Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt (CSU)last Thursday in the Bundestag all the threats because of which, in his opinion, we urgently need new intelligence laws. “We have to prepare ourselves against this,” he says mantra-like three times between his statements, which seemed to allow no contradiction.
The impression arises: The secret service reform, which Chancellery Minister Nina Warken (CDU) called the “biggest amendment to the law of the intelligence services in the history of our country,” is about really big dangers. That also means: If I'm not a disposable agent controlled from Russia or an undercover Hamas fighter in Germany, it has nothing to do with me. But that's wrong. The secret service reform, which is intended to “naturally” give the BND and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution operational capabilities, affects us all.
Second class confidentiality
The secret service reform concernsDoctors and their patients. It limits confidentiality in the treatment room.
People confide sensitive things to their practitioners in the consultation room - their bowel movements, their unhealthy lifestyle habits, their sexual health as well as their worries. In order for this to work and for us to open up, there is medical confidentiality. However, if the plans for a new BND and Constitutional Protection Act are anything to go by, this should not apply absolutely.
In the draft of the BND law, the medical profession is missing in the paragraph on “protection of confidential relationships”. According to the draft for the Federal Constitutional Protection Acthttps://www.bundesaerztekammer.de/fileadmin/user_upload/BAEK/Politics/Ste...a consideration must take place: Information versus confidentiality interest.
"If the most intimate information can be affected, this should not be left to a weighing decision by an authority. Instead, there must be absolute protection so that trust between doctors and patients can arise at all," says Carsten Dochow, head of the legal department of the German Medical Association,https://netzpolitik.org/2026/die-geheimdienstreform-untergraebt-das-vert...interviewwith netzpolitik.org.
“As an essential prerequisite for effective psychiatric and psychotherapeutic treatments, the confidentiality of the therapy itself is an element of effective violence prevention,” says the President of the German Society for Psychiatry and Psychotherapy, Psychosomatics and Neurology, Euphrosyne Gouzoulis-Mayfrank, in a statementhttps://www.dgppn.de/presse/pressemitigungen/pressemitigungen-2026/N...for a statementseveral psychiatric and psychotherapeutic specialist societies.
Deterrence and state Trojans
The secret service reform concernsJournalists and their sources. It undermines the foundations of journalistic work.
Like doctors, media professionals are subject to professional secrecy. In order to be able to research grievances and protect their informants, they must guarantee confidentiality. This torpedoes the secret service reform, because it also only offers relative protection.
“International press contacts mean that these are extremely interesting for the BND,” writes the Humanist Unionhttps://www.humanistische-union.de/thema/die-menschen-im-land-behaben-s...a statementto the draft law. But instead of raising the level of protection for media professionals to that of journalists in Germany, the proposal lowers the standards to what previously applied to the press abroad.
–––
The hut is on fire! We're going in.
We oppose fascisation. We fight for a free, open and solidarity-based society. We defend basic rights for everyone.https://netzpolitik.org/spenden/?via=rss">Thisonly possible with your support.
–––
Surveillance by the BND should be possible if those affected are “in connection” with a significant threat. This may mean being in contact with a person from whom relevant information can be obtained.
But other regulations in the law also restrict journalistic work.https://netzpolitik.org/2026/geheimdienstreform-der-schutz-von-journalis...interviewMaximilian Jung from Reporters Without Borders points out that automated data analysis could endanger and deter sources. In addition, a wider use of state trojans would undermine the confidentiality of digital communication. And this is an important basis for their work, and not just for journalists.
Violence without injuries
The secret service reform concernsClimate activists and sit-blockers. You will be more quickly targeted by the services.
The draft law defines very broadly what is “significantly in need of observation” for the Office for the Protection of the Constitution. This applies to a threat, among other things, “when crimes are committed in pursuit of a target” and a defined protected asset is impaired.
Criminal offenses can be all sorts of actions. This is the sticker on the street sign that counts as property damage. The formulation that an action is suitable as a threat if the goal is pursued with violence only limits a few things here.
“The concept of violence has been separated from everyday language in criminal jurisprudence,” writes the German Lawyers’ Association. This means: It is no longer a question of whether a person is injured. According to the Federal Court of Justice, there is also violencehttps://verfassungsblog.de/friedliche-violent/">Sit-insthat are peaceful– when a traffic jam occurs and people are prevented from moving on. Violence includes hands stuck to asphalt, which makes it difficult for the police officer to carry the demonstrators away. “The draft would therefore do well to make it clear that this only refers to violence beyond the trivial limit,” said the German Lawyers’ Association.
The screwdriver as vicarious agent
The secret service reform concernsAuto repair shops. Their employees become vicarious agents of the services.
The planned laws oblige many private actors to work for the German secret services. In addition to providers of digital services and telecommunications, car repair shops and vehicle manufacturers are also explicitly mentioned here.
They should provide the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution with telemetry data from cars upon request. Depending on the vehicle model, they reveal a lot: Where was a car parked? What was the mileage at the last charge? Was the light on and the belt tightened? What was the tire pressure and which window was open?
Strengthening state security structures should not lead to “car dealerships and vehicle repair shops becoming an extension of the intelligence services.”https://www.kfzgewerbe.de/zdk-zum-neuen-nachrichtendienstrecht-sicherheithei...the President of the Central Association of the German Motor Vehicle IndustryThomas Peckruhn. There should be “no precautionary collection of additional vehicle data” and “any direct access to the car must be rejected for security reasons.”https://www.vda.de/de/presse/pressemeldeen/2026/260812_Kommentierung_N...Hildegard Müller, President of the Automotive Industry Association.
The entire public space
The secret service reform concernsyou when you walk through a mall. Because the services could observe you in the future.
–––
The work of netzpolitik.org is financed by donations from our readers.
Become part of this unique community and support our public interest-oriented, advertising- and tracking-free journalismhttps://netzpolitik.org/spenden/?via=rss">nowwith a donation.
–––
There is a video camera in the kiosk, by the lockers in the swimming pool, in front of the entrance to the hospital and in the shopping center anyway. Video surveillance is everywhere. And in the future, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution should have extensive accesshttps://www.deutschlandfunknova.de/teil/ueberwachung-40-000-kameras-f...the thousands upon thousandsprivately installed surveillance cameras.
Anyone who operates private or public video surveillance should in future be obliged by the domestic secret service to pass on the data to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, to transmit stored data to the secret service or to allow them to share the cameras. The prerequisite: a “threat that requires at least considerable observation”. But in the search for the extremist or the disposable agent, countless people would be affected.
“The authority extends to the surveillance of the entire public space,” writes the Society for Civil Rightshttps://freiheitsrechte.org/uploads/publications/Digital/GFF_Stellungnah...their opinion. “In fact, all people who are in Germany are recorded by such video surveillance.”
Pseudo-limitations and many exceptions
The secret service reform concernseveryone who uses the Internet. Because the BND is actually allowed to snoop and search all transmitted data.
The BND is not allowed to monitor everything, especially domestically. “The Basic Law does not permit global and blanket surveillance, even for the purposes of foreign intelligence,” wrote the Federal Constitutional Court in a 2020 ruling. There is therefore a need to limit what the foreign secret service is allowed to snoop and search.
There is currently a volume limit of 20 percent of a transmission route that the BND is allowed to divert. In the future it should be 15 percent - but based on the data volume that “can be transmitted in all telecommunications networks”. So what initially sounds like a reduction is in reality a completely ineffective barrier.
“Even at the largest German internet node, no more than 15 percent of the capacity is generally used,” writes the lawyer and former ministerial director in the Federal Ministry of Justice Peter Schantzhttps://freiheitsrechte.org/uploads/publications/Digital/Stellungnahme_B...his opinion.
The restriction to “foreign” communication also becomes vague, not only because it can hardly be distinguished from domestic communication with 100% certainty. The previous barriers to communication between home and abroad will be adapted to pure foreign communication,https://anwaltverein.de/newsroom/sn-60-26-reform-des-nachrichtendienstre...the German Lawyers Association. In the future, exceptions will be added that will allow the BND to look into domestic data traffic - for example in the case of "terrorist, state or international" hacking attacks or if the survey is presumably necessary "to avert a significant threat to a particularly important legal interest".
–––
The work of netzpolitik.org is financed by donations from our readers.
Become part of this unique community and support our public interest-oriented, advertising- and tracking-free journalismhttps://netzpolitik.org/spenden/?via=rss">nowwith a donation.
Read the full story at the source
Source: de.indymedia