World Africa Is a Country
The Sahara was never a border
Imagining the Sahara as empty allows the relationships that sustain life there to be ignored, making outside intervention appear as the first arrival of order, development, or connectivity.
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In July, Algeria and Mali reinstated their ambassadors and reopened their airspace to each other, more than a year after Algerian forces shot down a Malian drone near the border town of Tin Zaouatine. Al Jazeera reported the thaw; Agence France-Presse (AFP) added that rebel advances in northern Mali had accelerated it, and that restoring cross-border security cooperation was a priority. In September, Algeria’s prime minister was received in Bamako with military honors.
The reconciliation is about a border that both governments say they cannot control.
Farther east, on the Algeria–Niger frontier, the same logic works differently. The Niger-based NGO, Alarme Phone Sahara, counted more than 34,000 people expelled from Algeria to Niger in 2025, a record, up from 31,404 in 2024 and 26,031 in 2023. Migrants who are not Nigerien are left at a desert spot known as Point Zéro and they walk about 15km to Assamaka.
Both stories treat the Sahara as a line to be secured: a front to be held, a space to be cleared of the wrong people. Judith Scheele’s Shifting Sands: A Human History of the Sahara (2025) is a sustained argument that this is the wrong picture. An anthropologist at the École des hautes études en sciences sociales, Scheele combines historical archives, including many Arabic-language accounts, with decades of fieldwork and interviews with Saharans themselves. Edward Said taught us that places are imagined before they are governed; Fernand Braudel, that seas link as much as they divide. Scheele applies both lessons to a desert.
Scheele’s Sahara is a human world. The book moves from a city-building civilization in Libya’s Fezzan, contemporary with the Roman Empire, through the caravan trades that carried gold, salt, textiles, and enslaved people to the borderlands of Algeria, Mali, Niger, Chad, and Libya that she knows from her own travels.
The caravan of gold and spice is the image that outsiders inherited, and Scheele asks readers to separate Saharan from trans-Saharan trade: the second is the part that crosses the region and so leaves traces in archaeological sites and in sources written beyond it. Most Saharan trade, she suggests, was in staples, the cereals, dates, salt, cloth, dried meat and skins that groups such as the Arba’a and the Tubu carried. The fabled gold was something the explorer René Caillié never saw in Timbuktu.
The trade in staples survives, and it remains, in Scheele’s phrase, “relatively democratic”: anyone with a four-by-four, some capital and enough cousins along the road can become a carrier or trade on their own account, and negotiate with Malian customs officials. She also notes that the advance of trade routes, and the political rivalries that followed in the Maghreb, pushed North Africans deeper into the desert until they had little choice but to become trans-Saharan traders. Mobility, here, was as much pressure as opportunity. In northern Mali, she visits al-Khalil in 2009 and finds its trade booming. The oldest permanent house there dates from 1993 and began as a store for arms for the separatist rebellion of the early 1990s. Commerce, rebellion and settlement, in the Sahara, are often built with the same walls. What these cases share is a desert that is never empty. It is inhabited not by permanent settlements alone but by routes, encounters, negotiations, and obligations.
Scheele applies the same method to the subjects that dominate the headlines. Slavery, racism, religious militancy, terrorism and desertification each get their own treatment, and in each case, as a reviewer for Foreign Affairs notes, she shows how familiar narratives often grow out of outsiders’ fantasies of the desert as an inhospitable, impermeable barrier. She does not romanticize that circulation. The same routes carried enslaved people, reproduced racial hierarchies and concentrated wealth in few hands. Nor did colonial rule invent every division: Saharan societies had their own rivalries and territorial distinctions. But colonial administrations hardened them into borders drawn around distant capitals, and began to treat older routes as marginal, illicit, or dangerous. Independent states inherited that architecture, and with it a contradiction: communities keep depending on cross-border movement, while official policy reads that movement as a failure of control.
This is why emptiness is never an innocent description. Calling an inhabited space empty lets existing relationships be ignored and makes outside intervention look like the first arrival of order, development or connectivity. Once a territory is imagined as a void, the people who live there are easily treated as obstacles to somebody else’s project.
That contradiction is not a historical footnote; it is what the current diplomacy is fought over. Tin Zaouatine is a border town that both capitals see as a security problem. ADF Magazine reports that Algeria fears fighting between Mali’s army and Tuareg rebels could spread to Algeria’s own Tuareg population. For the people who live there, kinship, trade and pasture run across a line that governments treat as the front of a dispute. Scheele’s history makes visible what the security language hides: that the border cuts through communities, rather than between them.
The same tension runs through the Alliance of Sahel States. Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger left the Economic Community of West African States in 2025 in the name of sovereignty, and their ministers have discussed harmonized travel and identity documents to ease movement among their own citizens. Yet, as the Migration Policy Institute observes, their exit exposed a tension between regional free-movement commitments and tightening security controls. Mobility is being re-sorted by membership: it is a right for some and suspicious for everyone else.
Niger shows how fast the rules can turn. In November 2023, its military government repealed a 2015 law that had criminalized the transport of migrants. By April 2025, it was warning, according to AFP, that mass arrivals of non-Nigerien migrants expelled from Algeria could upset the country’s security balance. The same movement is a trade, a crime, or a threat, depending on who is moving, in which direction, and which capital is speaking.
Policy built on the same imagination misses what keeps people alive. Security strategies aim to close routes without asking what work, exchange, and mutual dependence those routes sustain. Development programs talk of integrating peripheral regions that have long been integrated into networks that do not follow national maps. And the cost of getting it wrong falls on the people with the least power to contest it: those left at Point Zéro, who must walk through the desert to Assamaka, with some reportedly dying along the way, according to UNHCR, IOM and the Mixed Migration Centre.
Scheele’s book resolves none of this. But it changes what counts as normal. If circulation has been the Sahara’s ordinary condition for centuries, then drivers, traders, pastoralists, and migrants are not anomalies to be managed; they are the region’s own infrastructure. The question for the people in and around the desert is not what Europe should learn from the past. It is who decides which crossings count as trade, which as trafficking, and which as a threat; and who ends up at Point Zéro when the answer changes.