Venezuela’s battle for sovereignty continues

US diplomacy at gunpoint is designed to coerce Caracas but the Venezuelan leadership is attempting to limit the range of concessions, argue FRANCISCO DOMINGUEZ and ROGER D HARRIS

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UNDERNEATH the appearance of “normalcy” in the ongoing relationship between Venezuela and the US lies a manifest asymmetry of power. 

Even commentators from mainstream international news outlets frame their analyses by drawing attention to the proverbial US gun held to acting president Delcy Rodriguez’s head and, by implication, to the whole Chavista movement. That movement, founded by Hugo Chavez and carried forward by Nicolas Maduro, has broadly united behind her.

The US attack of January 3 killed over 100 people and succeeded in kidnapping President Maduro and First Lady Cilia Flores, an elected member of the National Assembly. But it failed to produce regime change or state collapse. Instead, the political and constitutional transfer of power remains intact along with the powerful constellation of grassroots organisations that sustain the Bolivarian Revolution.

The Chavista leadership has prioritised the preservation of the state as a rearguard base for future struggle. 

“Surviving in certain historical circumstances,” according to Jose A Amesty Rivera in Resumen Latinoamericano, “can also be a form of resistance.” The central question, then, is not whether Venezuela has made concessions, but whether those concessions represent capitulation or a strategy for preserving sovereignty under extreme duress.

The Chavista leadership avoided direct military confrontation with the US. The consequences would have been catastrophic, potentially leaving tens or even hundreds of thousands dead, destroying vital infrastructure, and inflicting long-term devastation on the oil industry on which the country depends.

Donald Trump has at his disposal a formidable US military architecture in the region to back up his threat that if Rodriguez “doesn’t do what’s right, she is going to pay a very big price, probably bigger than Maduro.” 

Washington maintains military bases, installations or access arrangements in Cuba, Puerto Rico, Honduras, Colombia, El Salvador, Aruba and Curacao, as well as numerous military installations in Florida; it also has military access and security arrangements in Panama and Guyana.

Ever since the unjustified and illegal US military attack on Venezuela, the Trump administration has exerted coercive pressure over Venezuelan decision-making, particularly regarding the country’s substantial natural resource wealth, including oil, gold and gas. 

This lies at the heart of the US policy of aggression with the aim — so far thwarted — of bringing about regime change.

Under these coercive conditions, the Venezuelan leadership has been forced to make decisions most probably intended to avoid a premature confrontation. Although the US objective is to impose domination over Caracas, Washington still needs to negotiate with the Venezuelan government. 

This asymmetrical balance of power has led the Chavista leadership to manage the historic contradictions between Venezuela and the US through the Bolivarian diplomacy of peace.

Trump is exploiting this power asymmetry, which finds expression in the recent oil agreement between the US and Venezuela — itself a direct outcome of the US military attack.

The “deal,” which critics may regard as capitulation to US pressure, demonstrates both the concessions Venezuela has made and the limits of those concessions.

The agreement covers 17 oilfields, including eight greenfield projects in the Orinoco Belt, reported to contain 65 billion barrels of proven reserves. The contract runs for 25 years, according to Venezuelan law — not 100, as Trump has claimed — but can be renewed. 

The project could attract US$100 billion in investment over 10 years, with the companies bearing approximately 70 per cent of the investment costs. At an estimated oil price of US$65 (£49) per barrel (the current price is above US$100/£76), Venezuela would receive 16 per cent in royalties and a 34 per cent income tax, amounting to approximately US$19 (£14) per barrel extracted and sold. Venezuela retains ownership of, and sovereignty over, its oil industry.

Compared with Guyana’s recent agreement with ExxonMobil, the Venezuelan arrangement far exceeds regional standards.  Guyana receives only 2 per cent in royalties and splits profits with ExxonMobil on a 50/50 basis after the oil consortium has recovered 75 per cent of its costs.

Venezuela’s much more favourable oil agreement operates under its new Hydrocarbons Law, passed by the National Assembly in January 2026, which incorporated production models that had already been introduced under Maduro. The law seeks to mobilise investment resources to increase oil-export capacity, which has been severely damaged by US sanctions. 

Similar agreements are being negotiated with major oil companies, including Chevron, Repsol, ENI, Shell and BP, while existing agreements with Russian and Chinese oil companies continue.

Washington’s coercion has not produced Venezuela’s international isolation or internal political disintegration. Since the events of January 3, the Venezuelan government has gained diplomatic recognition or renewed engagement from the US and a growing number of countries that had refused to recognise Maduro’s 2024 re-election. Brazil and Trinidad and Tobago have recognised Rodriguez as interim president, while Chile, Paraguay and the Dominican Republic have moved toward renewed or expanded relations.

The International Monetary Fund has resumed relations with the current Bolivarian government, restoring Venezuela’s access to approximately US$4.9 billion(£3.7 billion) in Special Drawing Rights and its reserve-tranche position, frozen since 2019.

Rodriguez addressed the UN general assembly on September 23. Navigating relations with Washington with extreme caution, she highlighted the devastating impact of sanctions on Venezuela’s development and their corrosive effect on freedoms. Venezuela’s National Assembly defended her “difficult diplomatic course” at the UN general assembly, while rallies were held across the country in her support.

It is difficult to say how long this asymmetrical “normalisation” will last. The Chavista leadership is seeking to buy time to recover the economy, while Trump is attempting to extract the maximum immediate economic benefit. As the pro-Chavista Venezuelan publication Mision Verdad reports, the Rodriguez-Trump meeting “does not symbolise a lasting alliance … but, rather, a temporary motive of equilibrium. It marks the establishment of a minimal framework of rules of the game in which [Washington’s] asymmetric coercion and [Venezuela’s] strategic adaptation converge to avoid uncontrolled chaos scenarios.”

Francisco Dominguez is the national secretary of the British-based Venezuela Solidarity Campaign. Roger D Harris is a co-founder of the North America-based Venezuela Solidarity Network.

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