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Can Hezbollah salvage Syrian networks without clashing with Damascus?

Can Hezbollah salvage Syrian networks without clashing with Damascus? Submitted by Reem Aouir on Wed, 11/11/2026 - 11:31 With its old supply corridor gone, Hezbollah is seeking alternatives and a mana

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Can Hezbollah salvage Syrian networks without clashing with Damascus?

Submitted by Reem Aouir on Wed, 11/11/2026 - 11:31 With its old supply corridor gone, Hezbollah is seeking alternatives and a manageable relationship with Damascus, analysts say
Syrian army soldiers patrol along the Syrian–Lebanese border in the rural area of Qusayr on 1 April 2026 (Bakr ALkasem/AFP) Syrian army soldiers patrol along the Syrian–Lebanese border in the rural area of Qusayr on 1 April 2026 (Bakr ALkasem/AFP) Off

Earlier this month, Syrian security forces announced they had thwarted a plot to target the Homs oil refinery in central Syria, arresting a cell they said was affiliated with Lebanon’s Hezbollah.

The Homs refinery, alongside the Baniyas facility on Syria's coast, is one of the country's two oil refineries and a key supplier of petroleum products.

Syria’s General Intelligence Service said it carried out a “pre-emptive security operation” with the Internal Security Forces. The authorities identified the two detainees only by their initials, "MS" and "BSh", without disclosing when or where they were arrested. They also published photographs of what they said were explosive devices and equipment seized from the cell.

Hezbollah denied the allegations, reiterating that it does not have any presence on Syrian territory and is not involved in “any activity that undermines the security and stability of Syria”.

The statement said attempts to drag Hezbollah’s name into cases “that have nothing to do with it” wouldn’t change “the reality of its firm and clear position”.

The group also said its priority remained confronting Israel and its attacks on Lebanon and Syria, arguing that Arab and regional efforts should unite around confronting Israel’s “expansionist schemes”, and that the accusations “serve only the interests of the Israeli enemy”.

The latest allegations come amid a series of raids by Syrian forces targeting smuggling networks that Damascus says are linked to Hezbollah since the fall of Bashar al-Assad. 

Neither the Syrian authorities nor Hezbollah have provided independently verifiable evidence to date establishing the alleged plot or the detainees' links to the group.

“The gap between the two accounts reflects a shift in the nature of the relationship,” Maher al-Tamran, a Syrian political writer and researcher, told Middle East Eye.

'I find it difficult to see what strategic benefit Hezbollah’s leadership could expect from authorising such an operation'

- Mohamad Hasan Sweidan, Lebanese political researcher

“Damascus is trying to establish a new equation based on the state’s monopoly over weapons and security decisions.” 

Tamran said the alleged targeting of a vital economic facility went beyond a security operation, amounting to an attempt to undermine the state’s ability to provide energy and services and restore stability.

Mohamad Hasan Sweidan, a Lebanese political researcher and writer, meanwhile said Hezbollah was facing an “existential challenge” and that its priorities were preserving its ability to fight Israel, securing an Israeli withdrawal and ending the attacks on Lebanon.

“An attack on Syrian economic infrastructure would be particularly difficult to reconcile with those priorities,” he told MEE.

“It could give Damascus a stronger incentive to act against Hezbollah, deepen the group’s regional isolation and divert resources from the confrontation with Israel.”

Syria was already under pressure from the United States and some regional actors to act against the group, he said, and operations of this kind would only strengthen those demands.

“I find it difficult to see what strategic benefit Hezbollah’s leadership could expect from authorising such an operation.”

From a strategic ally to hostile territory

For decades, Syria was a crucial regional partner for Hezbollah, serving as the group's strategic link to Tehran and the overland route through which Iranian weapons and military supplies reached Lebanon.

As the Syrian uprising spread, Hezbollah became one of the former president's most important military allies, sending fighters to support government forces and helping to secure strategically important areas.

In December 2024, six days after the overthrow of Assad, Hezbollah’s secretary-general Naim Qassem acknowledged that the group had lost its military supply route through Syria.

The resurrection of Hezbollah Read More »

He described the loss as “a detail in the resistance’s work”, and said the route could return to normal under a new government in Damascus, or the movement could “look for other ways”.

The loss did not necessarily end Hezbollah’s ability to obtain weapons, but it removed a supply channel that had operated for years with a friendly government's cooperation.

“For Hezbollah, Syria was never just a geographic corridor,” Tamran said.

“It was part of an integrated system that gave the group political, security and logistical cover, and linked the Lebanese front to Iran’s strategic depth. Losing Syria means losing an entire strategic environment, not just a route for moving weapons.”

Sweidan said the loss of the supply route “liquidates the continuous land corridor running from Tehran to the Mediterranean, and effectively ends the group’s role as an expeditionary regional force capable of deploying cadres freely across borders”.

“While basic armaments can always be acquired through unconventional means, the acquisition and integration of strategic game-changers, notably precision-guided missile conversion kits, heavy long-range rockets, advanced air defence systems and anti-ship capabilities depended heavily on Syrian state facilitation, protected military airfields and specialised military-industrial complexes,” he said.

Hezbollah also lost the Syrian hinterland, he added, which had provided “secondary depot storage, dispersed training grounds and secure fallback positions behind Lebanon’s narrow Bekaa Valley”.

Beyond geographical lines

In March 2025, deadly clashes broke out along the Syrian-Lebanese border after Damascus said Hezbollah had crossed into Syrian territory, abducting three members of its forces and killing them in Lebanon. Hezbollah denied involvement.

During the clashes, Syria’s defence ministry said its aim was to remove Hezbollah from villages near Qusayr, a Syrian town along a key supply route connecting the border region with Hezbollah areas in the Bekaa Valley.

'Syria’s borders are not just geographic lines, but social and economic spaces where family and tribal smuggling networks have formed over decades'

- Maher al-Tamran, Syrian political writer

The clashes ended after the two countries' defence ministers agreed to a ceasefire.

Later that month, Syrian and Lebanese officials met in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and agreed to strengthen security coordination and work towards demarcating their shared border.

But agreements between the two governments have not removed the challenges of securing the border shaped by years of smuggling, armed networks and overlapping groups and tribal ties on both sides.

“Syria’s borders are not just geographic lines, but social and economic spaces where family and tribal smuggling networks have formed over decades, some with overlapping ties to armed groups and local interests,” Tamran said.

Smuggling, he added, “cannot be treated as a purely security matter, separate from the local economy, poverty and the lack of jobs”.

For Damascus, reasserting control over the frontier is not simply about tackling illicit trade. It is also about preventing the re-emergence of the networks that allowed Hezbollah to move weapons and fighters through Syrian territory under Assad.

In July, Syria’s interior ministry said it would not allow Syria to be used “as a transit route or launch point for arms smuggling”.

'Strong reasons to prevent tensions'

Hezbollah may no longer have the protection of the Syrian state, but questions remain over whether local intermediaries, smuggling networks or weapons stockpiles survived the change in power.

“It is hard to speak of an organised Hezbollah military presence in the form we knew under Assad,” Tamran said.

“But it is also unrealistic to assume that the fall of the regime automatically made all of its extensions and local networks disappear.”

How Hezbollah rebuilt itself for a war of attrition with Israel Read More »

In October, the Syrian government and Hezbollah held secret talks in Turkey, according to Reuters.

One Syrian officials told Reuters that both sides agreed they held no hostility towards one another, and that Damascus assured Hezbollah it would not intervene militarily in Lebanon to disarm the group.

Syrian officials also asked Hezbollah to help stop “cross-border smuggling and dismantle its remaining sleeper cells, particularly in southern Syria”, the official said.

Hezbollah’s representatives “did not give a direct answer”, according to the official, but pledged not to interfere in Syria’s affairs.

Tamran said Hezbollah’s priority “may be to prevent Syria from becoming an environment hostile to its interests, more than trying to restore its former influence there”.

“I believe containment remains the most likely outcome,” Sweidan said. “The accusations and denials may continue, and there could be occasional security incidents, but both sides currently have strong reasons to prevent these tensions from developing into a sustained military confrontation.”

For Damascus, he said, a confrontation would consume military and financial resources, create more insecurity on the border and risk aggravating sectarian tensions. For Hezbollah, already facing continued Israeli attacks and occupation in south Lebanon, this would open up another front and further stretch its resources.

Less reliable alternative routes

Syrian authorities announced in May the coordinated arrest of an alleged Hezbollah cell accused of plotting to assassinate senior officials.

In July, the authorities said they had found long-range missiles, rockets and drones hidden in a tanker truck at al-Tanf border crossing with Iraq. The truck was heading for the Syrian coastal city of Baniyas.

The interior ministry said preliminary investigations indicated that the shipment was intended to transit through Syria for Hezbollah in Lebanon.

'Hezbollah’s priority may be to prevent Syria from becoming an environment hostile to its interests, more than trying to restore its former influence there'

- Maher al-Tamran, Syrian political writer and researcher

Hezbollah dismissed the accusation as “fabricated narratives with no basis in fact”. Iraqi authorities said they would form a high-level committee to investigate.

“Hezbollah is more likely to seek alternative supply channels while exploring whatever limited opportunities may remain through Syria,” Sweidan said.

“Any continued use of Syrian territory would probably be more constrained and less reliable than before.”

Reports of shipments intercepted near al-Tanf were therefore “unsurprising”, he added.

“Its calculation is to recover military strength while limiting the visibility, scale and political costs of any activity that could provoke a confrontation with the Syrian leadership.”

Reuters reported on 26 October, citing Lebanese security sources, that Hezbollah had received tens of millions of dollars from Iran to rebuild its military capabilities, with a focus on procuring explosives and producing drones.

“We have to distinguish between the ability to obtain funding and the ability to turn it into an integrated military force,” Tamran said.

“Nearly two years on, there is not enough public evidence that Hezbollah has succeeded in building an integrated alternative corridor to replace the old Syrian route.” 

Sweidan said Hezbollah had found “alternative means of replenishing at least part of its arsenal”, pointing to the group’s use of FPV drones during the fighting with Israel.

“The more difficult question is whether the available alternatives can provide the volume, reliability and range of military supplies that Hezbollah previously obtained through Syria,” he said.

However, Tamran said the old corridor had also provided protection, storage and coordination, and that “these elements are hard to replace simply by finding other routes”.

A manageable relationship

The significance of the latest alleged plot, and any future attempts, lies in the context of the Syrian government's efforts to consolidate control.

As the new Syrian government seeks to distance itself from the Iranian axis associated with the Assad era and present Syria as a state capable of securing its borders and maintaining internal security, damage to essential economic infrastructure could deepen the country's economic difficulties, place further pressure on the population and undermine confidence in its Arab and western relations.

Any attacks would make it harder for President Ahmed al-Sharaa's government to establish stability, potentially benefiting actors opposed to the new political order, including former Assad loyalists, Iran and Hezbollah.

However, Sweidan said that “a weaker Syrian state would not automatically give Hezbollah back what it lost.

'Hezbollah is more likely to seek alternative supply channels while exploring whatever limited opportunities may remain through Syria'

- Mohamad Hasan Sweidan, Lebanese political researcher

“The former corridor depended on a political relationship with Damascus. Economic deterioration alone cannot recreate that relationship or reverse the new leadership’s regional alignment.

“Hezbollah could potentially exploit gaps in state control, but that would provide a much more uncertain arrangement than the support of an allied government.”

Sweidan added that further instability in Syria could have repercussions in Lebanon, including border clashes, displacement and worsening economic conditions.

“It could strengthen actors hostile to Hezbollah and create additional opportunities for Israeli intervention,” he said.

Those wider costs, he added, “would outweigh the possible benefit of occasional openings for weapons transfers”.

Hezbollah may have lost Syria as an open ally and military base, but it has not lost strategic value. While Hezbollah denies any activity there, questions remain over the border, smuggling networks and the legacy of its intervention in Syria.

“Syria remains of great strategic importance to Hezbollah, but its place in the group’s order of priorities has changed,” Tamran said.

Its immediate priority, he said, is to survive and rebuild its strength inside Lebanon, not necessarily to regain Syria militarily or politically.

“Hezbollah’s preferred outcome would presumably remain a supportive Syria,” Sweidan adds.

“Under the current circumstances, however, its more immediate interest is a manageable relationship with Damascus that prevents another front from opening.”

However, Tamran argued, “the paradox is that Hezbollah now needs Syria more strategically, but has less ability than ever to influence its decisions.”

Ultimately, Hezbollah’s presence in Syria has become smaller, more covert, and increasingly challenged.

Syria after Assad News Post Date Override 0 Update Date Mon, 05/04/2020 - 21:19 Update Date Override 0
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